American Studies in China Vol.3, 1996 ON SEVERAL QUESTIONS IN SINOª²AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING CHINA¬ðS WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN TAO Wenzhao Sinoª²American relations had a prominent place in China¬ðs wartime diplomac y. Speaking in general, the United States was the country that gave China more a ssistance than any other one; it was China¬ðs most important ally during the Pac ific War; never in modern Chinese history had a foreign country involved s o deeply in China¬ðs internal affairs as the United States did at the end of the war, and the special relationship between the two countries formed during the war gave a great and profound influence on the postwar political development in China. This short essay will concentrate on three big issues rather than discus s some detailed historical facts. I. The Development of US Policy Toward Assisting China and Curbing Japan in the Earlier Period The United States was a country that had important interests in the Asian and Pacific region. The advocating of the open door doctrine at the end of the 1 9th century clearly demonstrated that it could not tolerate other powers¬ð divis ion of China into spheres of influence, excluding U.S. interests.During the first twenty years of the 20th century Japan expanded its influence in China tr emendously, using the soª²called ¡°godª²givenª²opportunity¡±, when the European powers wer e busy with the First World War.The United States, nevertheless, uniting with Eu ropean powers, was successful in containing Japan¬ðs expasionist momentum in Chi n a at the Washington Conference. Japan¬ðs ambition, however, was to gain the hege m ony in China rather than to be an equal partner among powers in dominating China .It launched the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 and openly challenged the Washington system. A few years later it started the fullª²scale aggressive war a gainst China. On Several Questions in Sinoª²American Relations American Studies in China As the initiator of the Washington system and the Nine Power Treaty, the U nited States took a weak position visª²aª²vis Japan.On July 16, 1937, the Chinese Government handed over a circular memorandum to all signers of the Nine Power Treaty, revealing the truth of the Lugou Bridge Incident, accusing Japan o f violation of the integrity of China¬ðs territory and sovereignty. Incidentally on the same day, after consultation with President Roosevelt the U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull issued a formal statement on the U.S. position, which was fu ll of vague and empty words on abstinence by all nations from using force in pu rsuit of policy, faithful observance of international agreements, equality of co mmercial opportunity and treatment, and so on and so forth. The most weighty wor ds were : Any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are threatene d is a situation wherein rights and interests of all nations either are or may be seriously affected... Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed f orces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases made by ot her counties.1 Ironically enough, sixty countries, including Japan, Germany and Italy, immediat ely expressed their approval of the principles proclaimed in the statement becau se there was no single word in it to condemn the aggressors. The July 16 statement was the openly declared policy of U.S.. The United St ates stuck to the position at the conference of the League of Nations and the N ine Power Conference, unwilling to go a step further.Even when the U.S. gunboat Panay, anchoring in the Yangtze River, was sunk by the Japanese troo ps, atta cking Nanjing, the response from the U.S. public and Congress was relatively mil d in general. Japan made an apology and paid 2.2 million as indemnity, and the incident was over. The weak and compromising position of the U.S. can be explain ed by the following reasons. First, the deepª²rooted isolationism and pacifism in the country. Isolation ism was a tradition in American diplomacy.American involvement in the First World War broke this tradition. But it did not bring any practical benefit t o the United States, and the idealism advocated by President Woodrow Wilson dur ing the war was shattered after the war. Isolationist trends, therefore,flooded again.2 The ¡°quarantine¡± speech made by the President in C hicago met a strong attack from the isolationists, who insisted that the Preside nt¬ðs whole approach to the international situation was entirely unacceptable as it was based upon the ¡° angelª²devil theory¡±, that is to say, on the assumpti on that the world was divided into ¡°peace loving ¡± and ¡°bandit¡± nations. And t he P resident was pointing to the ¡°American people down the road that led to the Wor l d War¡±.3 When the country was enveloped in such isolationist atmosphere, the government could not but took this doª²nothing position. Second, though the desperate situation of the great depression was basically reversed after several years of the New Deal, the American economy, however, was still in rehabilitation. Foreign trade was an important incentive to the econo mic recovery. The export to Japan was rather important to U.S. economy as it s ratio in the total American export was 8.4%,9.9% and 8.6% in 1932,1934 and 1937 respectively.4 The United States obviously did not want to offend Ja pan in order to avoid damage to U.S.ª²Japanese economic ties. Third, the appeasement to fascism was a common practice in the internatio nal politics at the time.After Mr.Navilie Chamberlain had taken the office of t he British Prime Minister in May 1937, the appeasement tendency went further. Ch amberlain held that ¡°our position in the Far East was a vulnerable one, and tha t if we were attacked by Japan in strength, we were not in a position, at all eve nts at the outset, to defend ourselves.¡±The British Government, therefore, came to the conclusion that one of the major goals of the British diplomacy was to a void hostile activities in the Far East.5 At the League of Nations¬ð conferenc e in September and October held to discuss the Sinoª²Japanese conflict, at the Ni ne Pow er Conference in November the British and French delegates looked to each other hesitantly and dared not condemn the aggressors.Even before the Nine Power Co nference Chamberlain clearly declared the British position in his address to the House of Common on October 21: I suggest that it is altogether a mistake to go into this conference talk ing about economic sanction, economic pressure and force. We are here to m ake peace, not here to extend the conflict6 Britain, France and America influenced each other in their attitude toward the J apanese aggression and no country was willing to take the lead to stop the aggre ssion and to do the justice. Fourth, having won quickly the first victories, the Japanese troops attemp ted to conquer China within a few months while China did not yet change its ima g e of being humiliated for a whole century, and the Chinese Government took nonª² r esistance policy after the Manchurian Incident. Even after the full scale w ar of resistance had begun, the Nationalist Government¬ðs leading group was not de termined to resist. Their tactics were ¡°to make peace through war¡±, ¡°to help bri ng about peace through war¡±, that is to say, the resistance was a compelled act i on, and its purpose was to bring back Japan to the negotiation table. In such ci rcumstances most foreigners lacked confidence in China¬ðs resistance and just st o od by as onlookers. Many observers held that China¬ðs final defeat was just a ma t ter of several months. In the Shanghai Campaign from August to November 1937 the Chinese side plunged a large number of troops and suffered heavy losses, the Ch inese air force was almost completely annihilated, and Nanjing fell into the han ds of the Japanese soon after. At that time few foreigners thought that China would recover from this s erious defeat. The Chinese nation, however, under the banner of the antiª²Japanese united front on the basis of the cooperation between the Guomindang(GMD) and the Chines e Communist Party(CCP), stood firmly and indomitably, miraculously enduring all the defeats and hardships, and smashed the Japanese plan to finish the war by su dden and concentrated attacks. And the Japanese aggressors deeply sank into the mire of the war with China, being unable either to retreat or to advance. I n March 1938 Franklin D. Roosevelt¬ðs special intelligence agent Evans F. Carlso n reported: The Chinese army is improving by leaps and bounds. The Chinese soldier co ntinue to be superior to the Japanese soldier, but the officers need traini ng in staff work and leadership. They are getting it... A spirit of quiet opt imism prevails at present. The Chinese are winning victories...7 The U.S. military attache¬ðs office also pointed out in its report in May that the Chinese appeared successful in blocking the Japanese on all the fronts, tha t the Japanese front was overspread and they could not launch a heavy blow that was able to smash the resistance, while China could withstand the Japanese attac k, depending on its superiority in manpower.8 Gradually, foreigners began t o look at China with new eyes, and some people of insight started to ponder ove r the strategic significance of China¬ðs War of Resistance. Following the Panay incident U.S. Ambassador of China Nelson Jo hnson sent sever al messages to the State Department. He feared that the Japanese were driven by a vision of eliminating ¡°all western influence among the Chinese¡±.He held tha t the United States should stand firm in getting a proper settlement of the matter or more trouble would occur in the future. In the face of what appeared to be A merican indifference, Johnson suggested, Nationalist leaders might move toward a n accommodation with Tokyo or, alternatively with Moscow since the Soviet Union had begun to extend credits and equipment to the KMT.¡°We must be prepared to fi ght ¡±, he concluded, ¡°if we want to be respected¡±.9 The Commander of the Asiatic Fleet Admiral Harry E.Yarnell repeatedly stat ed his view since the very start of the War of Resistance. He warned that the fa te of China, the Philippines, and the future of economic opportunities throughou t Asia were all a single issue, that to permit Japanese conquest of China was ta ntamount to abandoning the mainland of Asia and control of the Pacific Ocean. He believed that China was America¬ðs most important ally, that the only way to frustrate Japan¬ðs scheme was to aid China, and that, if Japan were not stopped, ¡° the white race would have no future in Asia.¡±10 Yarnell¬ðs reports caused att ention from the military. The Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William Leahy, who became the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after the outbreak of the P acific War, circulated Yarnell¬ðs reports among high officials of the State and W ar Departments, and among the President¬ðs staff. Some reports were sent directl y to the President himself. In mid 1938 the voice advocating assisting China and curbing Japan among th e U.S. officials became stronger. John Carter Vincent from the Office of Far East Affairs, t he State Department, in his memorandum of July 23 asserted: American interests and rights may not be preserved unless China¬ðs sovereig nty is preserved. China¬ðs sovereignty may not be preserved unless Jap anese militarism is defeated, and from the long viewpoint our involvement in the Far East may not be avoided unless Japanese militarism is defeated. Because once Japan conquered China, it would inevitably expand in Southeast Asia , and fell into a direct clash with Britain and the United States. So his conclu sion was: ¡° The chances of our involvement, were Japanese aggression in China t o prove successful, would be measurably greater than would be the chances of our becoming involved in the present conflict were we now to render reasonable assi stance to China ¡±.11 A little later the Secretary of Treasure Henry Morge nthau expressed similar view. In his letter of October 17 to the President. He wro te that German, Italian as well as Japanese fascists could never be content wi th their gains, that A victory in one part of the world is followed by outbursts of aggression elsewhere...We should learn the lesson which the history of the last seven yea rs has to teach us. Let us not repeat the shortª²sighted mistakes of Brit ain and France... Let us while we can peacefully do so try to check the aggr essors... By risking a little more than the cost of one battleship we can give r enewed vitality and effectiveness to the Chinese... what greater force for peace could there be than emergence of a unified China?12 Because the U.S. policy makers came to believe that China was able to with stand a protracted war, and realized the importance of China¬ðs War of Resistanc e to the U.S. interests, the U.S.Government began gradually to take measures to aid China and curb Japan. The first step to curb Japan was the moral sanctions a gainst Japan implemented in June 1938. The State Department advised 148 American manufacturers producing and selling Japan airplanes and spare parts not to sel l Japan any planes and aviation equipment in order to protest Japanese bombardm ent on peaceful inhabitants. The first step to aid China was the tung oil loan p romulgated in December 1938 and concluded in February 1939. The U.S. Government gave U.S.$25 million to China, and China would return by selling tung oil to t he United States. After that the U.S. Government once and again announced new me asures to support China at the critical and dangerous moments. On July 24, 1939, Britain made a compromise with Japan on the Tianjin concession issue and soª²c alled Aritaª² Craige Agreement was concluded. Two days later, the U.S. Gover nment proclaimed the abolishing of the commercial treaty between the U.S. and Ja pan. Just before the puppet regime came forth in Nanjing, America released news on March 7, 1940, about a new loan to China with Chinese tin as mortgage. On Jul y 17, 1940, Britain declared to close the Burma Road for three months under Japanese pressure. A week later, the U.S. made an announcement that licence s ystem would be introduced in the export of aviation fuel, lubrication oil and sc rap iron and steel to Japan. On September 25, 1940, two days after Japanese advance into Indoª²China, America released news about a new loan to China secured by tu ngsten ore from China, and at the same time the complete sanctions were enforced against Japan with reference to exporting scrap iron and steel. And President R ooseve lt was able to announce new financial assistance to China on the same day, Novem ber 30, 1940, when Japan and the puppet regime promulgated soª²called Treaty of Basic Relations and Chinaª²Japanª²Manchugo Common Declaration. It is appropriate to note that the orbit of the development of American po licy toward assisting China and curbing Japan was not a straight line.It went a zigzag way, and with relapses. A most significant event was the U.S.ª²Ja pan negotiations before the outbreak of the Pacific War, which lasted for more than half a year. Some scholars hold that ¡°The Memorandum of the Japaneseª²Am erican Understanding¡± was a plan to compel China to surrender, a ¡° Far East M u nich¡± conspiracy.13 Surely, the United States did want to make a compr omise with Japan, sacrificing some Chinese interests, including conditional reco gnition of soª²called Manchugo, ¡°to cooperate in preventing Communism¡±, advising Jiang Jieshi to collaborate with Wang Jingwei, etc. Nevertheless, th e re are two fundamental differences between the U.S.ª²Japan negotiations and the Munich Incident. First, in the Munich Incident Britain and France attempted to avoid conflict with the fascists and safeguard themselves by sacrificing a smal l country¬ðs interests. While the U.S. purpose in its talks with Japan was not t o avoid the war, but to delay the war and break up the tripartite alliance. As e arly as in September 1940, when Japan, Germany and Italy formed the alliance, Ro osevelt summoned the Secretary of State and the military leaders to consult. Th e consensus of the meeting was that the tripartite alliance was a gun aimed at t he United States, that the major threat to world peace came from Europe and fascist Germany was the major enemy to western civilization. Therefore, the U.S. global strategy should be ¡°Europe first, Atlantic first¡±, that is to say, to take offensive in the Atlantic toward Germany and to take defensive in the Pa cific toward Japan and try the utmost to delay the conflict with Japan so that i t could concentrate its strength in the Atlantic and have more time to get prepa red for the war in two oceans.14 It was under the guidance of this princi ple that the U.S. conducted its talks with Japan. In his letter of July 1, 1940, to the Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes Roosevelt stated: It is terribly important for the control of the Atlantic to help to keep p eace in the Pacific. I simply have not got enough Navy to go round- and every little episode in the Pacific means fewer ships in the Atlantic. 15 Even until November 1941, when both Roosevelt and Hull had no more doubt that the war with Japan was inevitable and imminent, the American military leaders, including the Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall and the Navy Chief of Operation Harold R. Stark still felt that they were not yet prepared for the war in both oceans and greatly wanted ¡°to try to delay this break to the last mome nt¡±.16 In short, the U.S. purpose of negotiating with Japan was to make p reparations for the forthcoming war with Japan rather than to appease Japan. Second, before and after the Munich Britain and France constantly made con cessions to Germany, allowing it to annex Austria and occupy Czech, while in the U.S.ª²Japan talks both sides followed the same guideline, namely, to do what i t should do regardless of the talks. Japan did not slow down its aggressive step s, while the United States implemented its policy of assisting China and curbing Japan without hesitation. It was during the talks that the U.S.Government announced the freezing of all Japanese assets in the United States, thus actuall y severing its trade relations with Japan. And the comprehensive sanctions again st Japan, including oil sanctions were soon followed after this.It was also duri ng the talks that Roosevelt signed the order in April to allow American servicem en to resign and join the American Volunteer Group headed by Claire Lee Chennaul t, declared in May that China was eligible to receive the Lendª²Lease assistanc e from the United States, and sent a military mission headed by Major John Magr uder to China in July to make an investigation on various problems relating to the Lendª²Lease assistance. If we listen to American words and watch its deeds, we should be able to make distinction between the U.S.ª²Japan talks and the Muni ch Incident. II. The Making of the Special Relationship There has been a popular argument that the special relationship between th e Nationalist Government and the United States was soon made after its establi shment in Nanjing in 1927. It was not the case actually.The leading group of th e Nationalist Government was composed of various factions. Judging by their atti tude toward foreign countries, there were factions proª² American, proª²British , proª²Japanese, and Proª²Russian. Jiang Jieshi kept a certain kind of balance a mong these factions, attaching importance to certain faction one time and to a nother faction the other time. It is hard to say that one faction was constantly in the dominant poistion. The special relationship was made during China¬ðs War of Resistance Against Japan, especially after the outbreak of the Pacific War. After the War of Resistance broke out, the Nationalist Government tried ha rd to neutralize Germany and succeded in doing so for the first half year. Never theless, Germany and Japan were all fascist countries, and the relationship betw een China and Germany at the time was entirely a tactical, expedient one. France , facing direct German threat in Europe, was even unable to fend for itself and to protect its interests in Indoª²China. It was far beyond its capacity to take an active policy in China. The Soviet Union was the only country that gave China substantial assistance at the initial stage of the war. But there existed gr eat ideological differences between the two governments and discrepancies betwe en the two social systems. What is more, there existed two political parties in China, which had been adversaries for more than ten years. These conditions coul d not exempt the Nationalist Government from deep doubts and anxiety. ¡°The peri l s and threats China is facing,¡± Jiang Jieshi concluded, ¡° are different. Those f rom Japan are obvious and easier to deal with, while those from Russia are hidde n and more difficult to prevent.¡±17 Britain had substantial interests in Chin a and Asia. But since the Opium War in 1840-42, Britain was a country that took the lead in foreign aggression against China and grabbed a lot of interests and privileges. Moreover, the British Government did not even think of changing its colonialist policy toward China as well as Asia. And in Europe Britain was c arrying out appeasement policy toward Germany. So Britain was certainly not reli able. After so many considerations and analyses, roughly in mid 1938, the Natio nalist Government came to the conclusion that the United States was the only cou ntry that China could rely upon, and that China¬ðs foreign policy should be base d on its close relations with the United States. Consequently, the Nationalist Government took a number of steps. In Septe mber 1939 Wang Zhengting, who was not so much welcomed by the United States, was recalled, an Dr. Hu Shi was sent to the U.S.as the ambassador. As a promine nt liberal intellectual, having educated in the U.S.,Dr. Hu enjoyed high prestig e in the U.S. Besides doing official business, he travelled all over the country , participating in various public meetings, making speeches there, accusing outr ages committed by the Japanese troops in China. His activities gained some sympa thies from the American public for the Chinese people. In June 1940 T.V. Soong w as sent to Washington, D.C. as Jiang Jieshi¬ðs personal representative in order to establish direct contact between Jiang and the White House. And the Nationali st Government did not let slip opportunities to express its willingness to fol low the U.S.lead. In February 1941 Roosevelt¬ðs Administrative Assistant Lauchl in Currie visited China. Jiang Jieshi had a number of talks with him, and the ti me of conversations put together amounted to twenty seven hours. Jiang Jieshi as serted in their talks: Peace in the Far East can be achieved only by the two belligerent parties¬ð attending the peace conference presided over by the United States; I am certain what President Roosevelt is now thinking is not only the Uni ted States¬ð present and future, but also the world¬ðs present questions and the questions of profound and lasting importance to the world after th e end of the war. In the world today President Roosevelt is the only figure wh o is able to take the great responsibility to clear up the messy situation left by the war. I will be happy to be his assistant and to make my contribution to our common cause; The cooperation between China and the U.S.during the war was just the firs t step of closer cooperation between the two countries after the war.18 These expressions were tantamount to tell the United States that China would fol low the U.S. leadership both during and after the war. After the outbreak of the Pacific War the United States became China¬ðs major ally, and, naturally, the r elations between the two governments grew closer and more intimate. It was also in America¬ðs interests to establish the special relationship b etween the two countries. ¡° Toward China we had two objectives,¡± Cordell Hull summarized in his memoirs. ¡°T he first was an effective joint prosecution of the war. The second was the recog nition and building up of China as a major power entitled to equal rank with t he three Western Allies, Russia, Britain, and the United States, during and afte r the war, both for the preparation of a postwar organization and for the establ ishment of stability and prosperity in th Orient.¡±19 The first objective does not need much explanation. The U.S. grand strate gy during the war was ¡°Europe first, Atlantic first¡±, and the U.S. concentrate d its major forces on fighting the Germans. On the Eastern front China¬ðs res i stance did not become less important after the U.S. and Britain¬ðs joining the w a r. The U.S. policy makers were aware of the importance at least because of the f ollowing reasons. First, the China Theater contained a great number of Japanese troops d uring the whole process of the war and thus lightened the military pressure on t he U.S. and Britain. ¡° Without China¡±, Roosevelt told his son Elliott, ¡° if C hi na goes under, how many divisions of Japanese troops do you think will be freed - to do what? Take Australia, take India - and it¬ðs as ripe as a plum for t he picking. Move straight on to the Middle East...¡±20 Second, in the fall of 1943 the U.S. changed its grand strategy to defeat Japan. Before that China was the base for final attack on Japan in the U.S. stra tegic thinking ; China was a base for American air attack on Japan during the wh ole process of the war. Third, China¬ðs resistance was of vital importance to the Asian people¬ðs an tiª²Japanese struggle. The people from some South and Southeastern Asian countries had been longed for casting off the yoke of Western colonialism. Using this nationalistic feelings, t he Japanese advertised themselves as ¡°the liberators¡± of East Asia and claimed as if the war they conducted were aimed ¡°at the aggression of Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, and the purpose of the war is to l iberate East Asia and to establish the lasting peace in East Asia¡±.21 Inf l uenced by the deceiving propaganda, a number of nationalistic leaders of some As ian countries cooperated with the Japanese for a time. In view of this China¬ðs resistance appeared even more important. As The U.S. Joint Intelligence Committ ee pointed out in its report of August 4, 1944 : ¡°Above all, the significance of the Asiatics resisting the encroachments of other Asiatics is of tremendous political and psychological importance.¡±22 With regard to the second objective it is necessary to discuss Roose velt¬ðs considerations of the postwar world. There were two major themes, namel y, to liquidate the old colonial empires and to establish a new system of great power cooperation. Roosevelt predicted that the victory of the antiª²fascist war would certai nly be accompanied by the surge of the nationalist independent movement, and th at the British, French and Dutch colonial empires could not survive or b e restored after the earthª²shaking world war because the people of the colonies and semiª²colonies could not reaccept the the British, French and Dutch rule after expelling the German, Italian and Japanese aggressors. He held that Britain, France and the Netherlands should treat their former colonies as Americ ans t reated the Philippines.23 Objectively, this position was in accordance wit h the w ill of the people of the colonial and semiª²colonial countries and with the tren ds of the times,on the one hand, and on the other, the United States could expan d its influence to these countries and regions to fill in the political vacuum w hile the British, French and Dutch were withdrawing. Roosevelt also envisaged that the cooperation between the allies would con tinue after the war, and a single international organization would be set up in order to preserve peace and solve the international issues. This organization wa s the major place for great powers to cooperate, and the four ¡°policemen¡±, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China should play the dominant role in it. The great powers were not in complete accord with regard to their conside rations about the postwar world. During the war Britain and the Soviet Union did not oppose the postwar cooperation and the establishment of an international o rganization. Nevertheless, Britain was disgusted with the U.S. proposition of de colonization.Winston Churchill and other British policy makers made the ir position very clear :¡°Never would we yield an inch of the territory that was under the British Flag¡±24 The Soviet Union¬ðs major concern wa s about its spheres of influence. In December 1941, when Anthony Eden visited th e Soviet Union in order to normalize the Britishª²Soviet alliance and revi ew the military situation, Stalin insisted that the Baltic countries and parts of prewar Poland, Finland and Romania be annexed to the Soviet Union.25 T he Soviet Union also intended to build a breakwater along its eastern border. Besi des Mongolia, which it had regarded as its sphere of influence for long, this breakwater should be built also in China¬ðs Xinjiang and Notheast. To sum up, t he great powers all tried to preserve and expand their own influence and to avoi d being weakened. The United States needed an ally to carry out its design about the postwa r world as it did during the war. A China, stable, united and friendly to the Un ited St ates, was its major ally in the Asianª²Pacific region. Roosevelt had no do ubt that Jiang Jieshi supported his conception about the postwar world. And he w as fully aware of the differences between China and Britain with regard to the questions of India, the Burma Campaign, the Sinoª²British treaty in January 1943 , and the British loan to China. And it was also clear to Roosevelt that Jiang Jieshi cherished ¡°deep distrust¡± about the Soviet intention toward China. Jian g doubted very much about ¡°Russia¬ðs desire to communize China and perhaps for a complete conquest and annexation to Russia of a portion of China.¡±26 It w as Roosevelt¬ðs firm belief that China would be sided with the United States in a ny political dispute between the United States and Britain, or between the Unite d States and the Soviet Union over the Asianª²Pacific questions, that China woul d be able to cope with rerisen Japan, that China would also help the United Stat es to establish the international trusteeship over the colonies broken away from their former suzerains, that, consequently, China would play a very important st abilizing role for the peace regime in Asia dominated by the United States. Obvi o usly, China and the United States needed each other, and the establishment of th e special relationship was a natural matter. Therefore, it was in American interests to raise China¬ðs international stat us. The U.S. did make continued efforts in this regard. It was mainly because of Roosevelt¬ðs advocation that China, as one of the leading powers, signed The Declaration of the United Nations together with the U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union, which was published on January 1st, 1942. In October 1943 the United Sta tes insisted that China join the other three powers and sign The Fourª²Pow er D eclaration on General Security, which laid the foundation for the forthcom ing U nited Nations. At the Cairo Conference in November 1943 China¬ðs position as a g r eat power was again confirmed by Roosevelt, who also concurred with inclusion of the returning of the Chinese territory stolen by Japan to China after the war, which was extremely important to China¬ðs sovereignty and territorial integrity. In September and October 1943 the Chinese representatives participated in the Du mbarton Oaks Conference for preparing for the establishment of the United Nation s. I n the spring of 1945 China together with the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union initiated the San Francisco Conference to work out The Charter of th e Unit ed Nations and became one of the permanent members of the Security Council . In all these activities the United States gave China its full support.27 No doubt, China, as a major ally in the antiª²fascist war, having fought for longer than any other country, made so many sacrifices and so great contri butions to the victory over the fascists, deserved the great power status. This is a different matter from Roosevelt¬ðs efforts to promote China to one of the f our great powers out of his military and political considerations. III. The Change of the U.S. China Policy at the End of the War The U.S. China policy during the war can be summarized as supporting Jiang Jieshi and tolerating the CCP in order to resist Japan. This policy acknowledge d that the Nationalist Government with Jiang Jieshi as its leader was the only le gitimate government representing China. Nevertheless, it was a government ruled by one party, and it should be democratized, should overcome and avoid fascist tenden cies. The policy also held that different political parties and factions should eliminate their differences and unite for a common cause of resisting Japan, tha t the CCP was one of the antiª²Japanese forces and had grounds to exsist and to develop to certain degree. This policy was in accordance with common interests of allies in their antiª²fascist war. On the basis of this policy the United States opposed the GMD diehards¬ð military attack on the CCP because the internal split would certainly weaken the efforts in the war. One month after the New Fourth Army Incident Roosevelt¬ðs A dminist rative Assistant Lauchlin Currie came to China, bringing Roosevelt¬ðs message: There are more common grounds between the GMD and CCP than their differen ces.I sincerely hope that the two parties will eliminate their differences and strengthen their solidarity for the common purpose of resisting Japan... This was the U.S. Government¬ðs first clear statement about China¬ðs interna l problem, and Roosevelt did not conceal his sympathy with the Communists, sayin g that ¡°the Communist Party¬ðs attitude toward peasants, women and the Japanes e deserves our commendation.¡±28 In mid 1943 Jiang Jieshi attempted to laun ch a new military attack on the CCP, and the relations between the two parties beca me very strained. On August 19 in a long conversation with T.V.Soong Stanley Ho rnbeck, senior Political Advisor to the State Department, reminded T.V.Soong of their talk soon after the New Fourth Army Incident and confirmed that the State Department¬ðs attitude remained the same, that China should avoid the civil war. General Stilwell went even further, suggesting that General Hu Zonnan¬ðs troops that were blockading the Communist troops and the Communist troops that were bei ng blockaded be all sent to the front to resist Japan.29 The GMD was comp el led to listen to some of the U.S. advice, while rejecting the other. Any way, th is U.S. attitude was certainly a plus for preserving the antiª²Japanese national united front in China. On the basis of the policy the United States from time to time advised the Natonalist Government to carry out democratic policies. Being an economist, Cu rrie discussed more about China¬ðs economic, financial questions during his firs t visit to China. Meanwhile he asked Jiang Jieshi several times : ¡° What is the ef fect of your practising democracy ? ¡± He also asked Jiang to place the same imp ortance on democratic politics, economic and social policies as on military matt ers.30 In his public speech before leaving Chongqin Currie claimed that Ch i na need complete democracy from bottom up and fundamentally change the corrupti ve political structure.31 American diplomats in their many talks with the GMD officials expressed the same opinion. Charge d¬ðAffairs George Atcheson in his t alk with the Secretary General of the GMD Central Committee on September 12 crit i cised ¡°apparently increasing Fascist trends and consequent weakening of practic al democracy¡±.32 And General Hurley also told the Communist represent atives in Chongqin Lin Boqu and Dong Biwu that the present government was not democrat ic and needed reform. On the basis of this policy many American diplomats and servicemen had qui te a lot of connexions with the CCP and got rather favorable impressions about the Communists. Among the guests who visited the Communists in Chongqin were t he U.S. embassy officials like John Carter Vincent, John P. Davis,Jr., John S. S ervice, Everrett F. Drumright, O. Edmund Clubb, Military Attache David D. Barret t, Assistant to the Military Attache Morris B. Depass and others. Currie and Wen dell L. Willkie during their visit to China all met Zhou Enlai and had long con versations with him. Zhou left a good impression on them. Many American diplomat s and servicemen made comparison between the CCP and GMD and came to the conclus ion that the Communists were making sincere efforts to resist the Japanese, tha t they were dynamic and full of vigor and vitality, and that China¬ðs future be longed to them rather than the GMD. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the very basic point of th e wartime U.S.China policy was to support Jiang Jieshi¬ðs leadership. Roosevelt was not satisfied with Jiang. He told his son Elliott during the Cairo Conferen ce that Jiang¬ðs troops were not fighting. And he was also unsatisfied with Ji ang¬ðs rejecting Stilwell¬ðs proposal to train the Chinese army and keeping ¡°th ou sand and thousand of his best men up in the northwest, up on the borders of Red China¡±.33 And also in Cairo in a conversation with Stilwell and Davis he asked anxiously how long Jiang could hold on. And he might even have an idea of ¡° changing horse¡±.34 But Roosevelt after all believed that there was no man in China who could be better leader than Jiang. In 1943, when Marshall and Stilwel l, having had so many difficulties with Jiang in the military cooperation, sug gested quid pro quo tactics toward Jiang, Roosevelt wrote an unusually long let ter to Marshall on May 8. He said: Thank you for letting me see the copy of Stilwell¬ðs letter of February nin th...I have read this letter with a good deal of care and my first thought is that Stilwell has exactly the wrong approach in dealing with the Generali ssimo Chiang... All of us must remember that the Generalissimo came up the hard way to be come the undisputed leader of four hundred million people - an enormously di fficult job to attain any kind of unity from a diverse group of all kinds o f leaders - military men, educators, scientists, public health people, engi neers, all of them struggling for power and mastery, local or national, and to create in a very short time throughout China what it took us a couple of cen turies to attain. Besides the Generalissimo finds it necessary to maintain his positio n of supremacy. You and I would do the same thing under the circumstances. He is the Chief Executive as well as the Commanderª²in ª²Chief, and one cannot speak sternly to a man like that or exact commitments form him the way we might do from the Sultan of Morocco.35 It is hard to say that this was entirely Roosevelt¬ðs true thinking. But on e thing is clear that he trully thought that there was no leader in China more c apable than Jiang. Having elaberated his thought in a letter to the Chief of St aff so seriously, he actually proclaimed this formally as his policy toward Chin a and asked his subordinates to implement it in their practice. A few months lat er, in a talk with his close friend, Deputy Secretary of State Sumner Welles, he expressed the same idea: The Generalissimo, limited as his military vision might be, and badly as his troops were fighting, was the only Chinese leader who could keep the Chinese a rmies in the field against the Japanese and who would be able after the war to hold the Chinese people together.36 In Cairo he restated the same idea to his son and said: ¡° But at the momen t who is there in China who could take Chiang¬ðs place?There¬ðs just no other le ader. With all their shortcomings, we¬ðve got to depend on the Chiangs.¡±37 With the war approaching to a close, the American policy makers became inc reasingly worried about GMDª²CCP contradictions and the direction of postwar Ch ina¬ðs political development.In his talk with Sumner Welles Roosevelt expressed his deep anxiety about it. He said that no spot was more likely to create diffic ulties in the postwar years than China, that the civil war in China, which was l ikely, would get the Soviet Union and the Western powers involved, and that ther e would be very much the same situation one had witnessed in Spain during the ci vil war, only on a far greater scale, and with graver dangers inherent in it. 38 Obviously, once the civil war in China broke out, China was certainly u n able to play the stabilizing role. Moreover, it would damage the postwar great p o wer cooperation. To Roosevelt¬ðs mind, the way to avoid this scenario was to for m a GMDª²CCP united government while the war was still being fought. He made a p r oposal to Jiang in Cairo, and the latter agreed contingently.39 When Vice Pres ident Henry Wallace visited China in June 1944 he again mentioned this and broug ht Roosevelt¬ðs message: As much as the Communist and the members of the Kuomintang were all Chines e, they were basically friends and that ¬ðnothing should be final between f riends¬ð...if the parties could not get together they might ¬ð call in a frie nd¬ð and... he ¡²Roosevelt¡³ might be that friend.40 Evidently, Roosevelt on his own initiative suggested to mediate between the G MD and CCP. Jiang readily accepted the proposal and asked Roosevelt to send a personal representative to China. It is appropriate to note that neither Roosevelt, nor the Department of State had any clear conception about GMDª²CCP cooperation and the ¡° united government ¡± . It was the American diplomats in China who first put forward a more concrete idea. The Chinese army¬ðs defeat in the ¡° Ichigo Operation¡± in 1944 caused gre at anxiety among the officials from the U.S.embassy in Chongqin. At the end of June and the beginning of July they discussed in the embassy the possible ways to sa ve the situation and envisaged a preliminary scheme: to form a war council or h igh command with Jiang Jieshi as its leader and including all major parties and factions of the country, and collectively assume the war responsibility, with Ji ang¬ðs promise not to play political tricks in the military command. Councillor A tcheson in his talks with Sun Fo on July 4, August 9,and Ambassador Clarence E.G auss in his talks with T.V. Soong on July 11 and with Jiang Jieshi personally on September 4 repeatedly advocated this recommendation.41 Gauss reported in gr eat details about this to the State Department. The President and the Secretary of State after careful considerations instructed Gauss on September 9: It is requested that you inform Chiang that the President and I feel that your suggestion is practical and timely and deserving of careful cons ideration...that we are not interested in Chinese communists and other dis sident elements as such, but that we are anxious on our own behalf a nd on the United Nations¬ð behalf, as well as on behalf of China, that the Chine se people develop and utilize, under the leadership of a strong but represent ative and tolerant government, the physical and spiritual resources at their command in carrying on the war and in establishing a durable d emocratic peace... We feel that a council or some body representative of al l influential elements in the country and with full power under Chiang¬ðs le adership would be a most effective organ for achieving this end.42 It is evident that at the time the United States had just a kind of desire rat her than a concrete plan. After Hurley came to China as the President¬ðs person al representative he became the key person in handling GMDª²CCP contradictions. Much research has been done in China in recent years about the Hurley¬ðs me diation and the major facts about it are now quite clear to us. Therefore, it is unnecessary to redescribe the process of the mediation. Consensus has been reac hed on the following three points. First, Hurley¬ðs trip to Yan¬ðan was not a deliberate political fraud. He si ncerely accepted the CCP¬ðs five point proposal because he held this was the onl y way to let the Communists to hand over their control of their troops. He chang ed his position and turned to support Jiang¬ðs three point counterproposal beca use he believed that it was his task to back Jiang unconditionally. Second, Hurley did implement Roosevelt¬ðs policy in his mediation. It is tr ue that he did not report everything to the President. The latter, however, was aware of the process of the mediation. What is more, Roosevelt supported him in his debate with the career diplomats. So it is groundless to conclude that it wa s Hurley who led the U.S. China policy to the wrong track.43 Third, the U.S. China policy at the time was not to support Jiang in lau nching military attack on the CCP. Rather, it was the policy to support Jiang un ilaterally, to put pressure on the CCP to compel them to accept Jiang¬ðs condit i ons and abandon their independent armed forces and abolish their independent gov ernment. The CCP at the time still hoped that the U.S. decision makers w oul d one day correct their wrong policy, and their criticism was aimed at Hurley pe r sonally. In the period immediately after the war the major expression of the U.S . China policy was to support the Nationalist Government to monopolize the right to accept the Japanese surrender and exclude the CCP in receiving the surrender of the Japanese and puppet troops. It is necessary to emphasize, however, that many researchers have often ne glected one thing. The change of the U.S. China policy at the end of the war wa s a gradual process.The process took place from September 1944 to April 1945.Th e major events in it included the recall of Stilwell, Wedemeyer¬ðs investigation of the U.S.servicemen and OSS officials¬ð exploration of the possibility to coop e rate with the Communists, the reorganization of the U.S. Army Observer Section i n Yan ¬ðan, the failure of the Hurley¬ðs mediation, the debate between Hurley and the ca reer diplomats. Hurley¬ðs mediation was the central question, but not the only o ne . Hurley¬ðs press conference in Washington at the beginning of April 1945 can be regarded as an indication that the change of the U.S. China policy was principal ly completed. The change can be described more clearly only when one studies the various questions in Sinoª²American relations during the period and pays full a ttention to the connexions among them. Notes 1¡¡The U.S.Department of State,ed., Foreign Relations of the United St ates, Diplomatic Papers (hereafter FRUS),1937, Vol.I (Washington, D .C.:Government Print ing Office, ),pp.699ª²700; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York:The MacMillan Company,1948 ),pp.535ª²536. 2¡¡William L. Langer, S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Islation, 1937-1940 (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1952), Cha pter I. 3¡¡Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Easten Crisis of 1933ª² 1938 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964 ), pp .389ª²391. 4¡¡Warren Cohen, America¬ðs Response to China (New York: John Wi ley and Sons, 1980), p. 147. 5¡¡W.N.Medlicott,Couglas Dakin and others, eds., Documents on British Forei gn Policy, 1919ª²1939, (London: Her Majesty¬ðs Stat ionary Office, 1984), Second Series, Vol.XXI, pp.788ª²789, 810ª²812. 6¡¡Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton University Press,1950), p.14. 7¡¡Donald Schewe, ed., Franklin Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs (New York: Clearwater Publishing Company,Inc. 1969), Second Seri es, Vol.IX, p.290. 8¡¡Paul Kesaris,ed., United States Intelligence Report, China, 1 911ª²1941 (microfilm) Vol. 10, No. 0694. 9 Russell D. Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson and American Policy toward Chin a ( East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1968 ), p.135; Michael Schaller, The U.S.Crusade in China (New York, Columbia University Press, 1979), p.1 8. 10¡¡Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, pp.19ª²20. 11¡¡FRUS, 1938, Vol. III(GPO, 1954),pp.235ª²237. 12¡¡Donald Schewe, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Second Series, Vol. XI, pp. 390ª²392. 13¡¡See The Editorial Board on Compiling the Series of the History of Si no ª² American Relations, eds., Selected Papers on the History of Sinoª²Ameri can Relations (Nanjing University Press, 1991), Book III, p. 291. 14¡¡See Tao Wenzhao, A History of Sinoª² American Relations, 1911 ª²1950 (Chongqin Publishing House, 1993), pp213ª²214. 15¡¡Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.His Personal Letters, 1928ª²1945 , (New York: Duel, Sloan and Pearce, 1947), Vol. II, pp.1173ª²4. 16¡¡Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, p.300. 17 Keiji Furuya, Translated by Central Daily Publishing House, Pre sident Jiang¬ðs Confidential Records ( Taibei: 1977), Vol. 11, p. 100. 18¡¡Committee on Party History of the Central Committee of Guomindang, e ds. , Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China¡ªThe Period of t he War of Resistance against Japan, Vol.III: Diplomatic Relations during th e War (hereafter Diplomatic Relations)(Taibei, 1981), Book I, pp.593,551, 559. 19¡¡Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p.1583. 20¡¡Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duel, Sloan a nd Pearce, 1946), p.53. 21¡¡Translated by Tianjin Political Consultative Conference¬ð Editorial Board, The Memoirs of Takeo Imai (Beijing: China Culture and History Publishing House, 1987), p. 350. 22¡¡RG 218, Records of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Box 563, NARS. 23¡¡Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p.165; Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1951), pp.1 50ª²151. 24¡¡Sterndaleª²Bennett to Seymour, April 24, 1945, FO 371/46325, Public Record Office, London. 25¡¡William H. McNeill, America, Britain and Russia. Their Coopera tion and Conflict, 1941ª²1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 167. 26¡¡The U.S. Department of State, ed., Foreign Relations of the Un ited States. Conference at Cairo and Teheran (GPO, 1961), p.102. 27¡¡See Tao Wenzhao, Yang Kuisong and Wang Jianlang, China¬ðs Fore ign Relations During the War of Resistance Against Japan ( Beijing: The CCP History Publ ishing House, 1995), Chapter VIII. 28¡¡Diplomatic Relations, Book I, p.543. 29¡¡Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell¬ðs Mission to C hina (GPO,1953), p. 368. 30¡¡Diplomatic Relations, Book I, pp.550,561; See The Docume ntation Researc h Institute of the CCP Central Committee, ed., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai, 1898ª²1949 (Beijing, 1989), p.492. 31¡¡The Documentation Research Institute of the CCP Central Committee, A Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1898ª²1949 (Beijing, 1989), p.491. 32¡¡FRUS, 1943, China (GPO, 1963), p.334. 33¡¡Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough, A Rendezvous with Destiny: The Roosevelt of the White House ( New York: G.P. Putnanm¬ðs Sons, 1975), p.34 8. 34¡¡Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, pp. 151ª²15 2. 35¡¡Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell¬ðs Mission to C hina, p.279. 36¡¡Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, p.15 1. 37 Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough, A Rendezvous with Destiny, pp.348ª²349. 38¡¡ Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, p.1 52. 39¡¡ Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p.164. 40¡¡ The U.S. Department of State, ed., United States Relations wi th China. With Special References to the Period 1944ª²1949 (GPO,1949), p. 549. 41¡¡FRUS, 1944, Vol. VI, pp. 116ª²117, 124ª²126, 138ª²139, 5 44ª²545. 42¡¡FRUS, 1944, Vol. VI, pp.567ª²568. 43¡¡Generally speaking, Chinese scholars have different opinions from th eir American counterparts on the point. See, for example Michael Schaller, Th e U.S. Crusade in C hina, p.170; John S. Service, The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the Histor y of U.S.ª²China Relations (Berkeley: University of California press, 1971 ), pp. 103ª²104, 95.