American Studies in China Vol.3, 1996 FROM NUCLEAR NONª²PROLIFERATION TO COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN WU Zhan I. The Nuclear Nonª²Proliferation Treaty Nuclear weapons have spread in the world since the two fission bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. There are now five declared nuclear weapon states (NWS) and a number of threshold nuclear weapon states which have the intention, and are technologically capable, of making nuclear weapons. These threshold states, including India, Pakistan and Israel, may have already stocke d up nuclear weapons covertly or may be just on the verge of doing so. Only Sout h Africa admitted it had made six crude fission bombs which had been dismantled, however.1 All states that operate nuclear reactors are potentially the proli fe rators (there are scores of them), as plutonium can be extracted from the spent fuel. The Nuclear Nonª²Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 is an international effo r t to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It seems unfair and discriminatory b ecause it allows the have¬ðs to keep and develop their nuclear arsenals while pr o hibiting the haveª²not¬ðs from building their own. Despite the inclusion of Arti cl e VI on nuclear disarmament,2 it is vague in that no deadlines are set. Conseq ue ntly, nuclear inequality may be extended indefinitely. This has often been used by some threshold states like India as a reason for refusal to join the NPT. From Nuclear Nonª²Proliferation to Comprehensive Test Ban American Studies in China This is one aspect of the matter. The other is taking a first step towards t he total elimination of nuclear arms, no matter how ineffective it may seem. The NPT embodies the strong aspirations of all countries towards a nuclearª²free wo r ld. As the nuclear weapon is perhaps the most lethal one of massive destruction, its largeª²scale presence in the world is a deadly threat to all countries. Tha t is why the NPT receives strong worldª²wide support. Denying the right of nonª²nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to develop nuclear we a pons while permitting a few big powers to retain their nuclear arsenals sounds a s if power politics is in play. Yet we have no choice but accept this unfairness for the sake of world peace and security. Of the two evils we have to choose th e lesser one. Since the monopoly of nuclear weapons by a few big powers is an issue left over from history and can¬ðt be changed soon, we have to maintain the status quo for the moment. As there is no overriding authority that can dictate others, the international system will have to be governed by the ¡°law of the jungle,¡± i.e ., the strong do what they will, while the weak do what they can. This inevitably entails a world wide nuclear arms race. The NPT was extended indefinitely in 199 5 by an overwhelming majority vote at a review conference of treaty members in N ew York.3 However, the NPT is merely a transitional measure. Nuclear weapons w ill in the long run be eliminated. In parallel with the NPT, regional arrangements for nuclearª²weaponª²free zo ne s (NWFZ) have been developed in the past four decades. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty , the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty (for Latin American and Caribbean States) , the 198 6 Rarotonga Treaty (covering the South Pacific) have all entered into force. The Pelindaba Treaty (for African States) is now open to signing and ratification a nd may enter into force in 1997. In December 1995, 10 Southeast Asian countries agreed to create the Southeast Asia Nuclearª²Weaponª²Freeª²Zone Treaty. These a rra ngements have transformed most of the Southern Hemisphere into a zone free of nu clear arms. Nevertheless, Southern Asia and the Middle East are not able yet to join the NWFZ club, because India, Pakistan and Israel refuse to accede to the NPT. India says it is faced with nuclear threat both from China and Pakistan, wh ile Pakistan declares that it will forgo its nuclear weapon program if India wil l. Israel allegedly has a covert stockpile of nuclear weapons. It is my opinion that India¬ðs assertion of Chinese nuclear threat is groundless. China sticks to the ¡°noª²firstª²use¡± policy. It is committed to not using nuclear weapons firs t an d not using them against nonª²nuclearª²weapon states or nuclearª²weapons ª²free zone s. Hence it constitutes no threat to any other country. I hope nuclearª²free agr eements will be reached by relevant nations in these two regions. II. Nuclear Deterrence and Economic Interdependence When the two superpowers in the Cold War built up their gigantic nuclear ars enal s which were roughly on a parity with each other, they entered into a position w here a nuclear attack by either would result in mutual destruction, as each had the residual capability to destroy the other after absorbing a first strike. Thu s neither side dared to launch a nuclear war during the past fifty years. Ev en a conventional war between them did not break out, as both were afraid of the consequence of escalating it into a nuclear war. Whenever a war was on the verg e of breakª²out, one of the superpowers would give in to relax the tension. Ther e fore nuclear deterrence may be the major reason why a third world war has not ha ppened in the past half a century, even though there had been so many crises. Bernard Brodie, an American strategist who understood the role of nuclear de terrence at a very early time, argued in 1946 that nuclear weapons were ¡°absolu t e weapons¡± designed not for use but for deterrence. He meant that the nature of war changed after both parties were in possession of nuclear weapons.4 If nuclear weapons can deter wars, is the world safer with more nuclear weap on states? No, of course not. No war in the last fifty years is on a world scale . In fact, there have been small wars on a regional level in any of the fifty years. Neighboring countries fought against each other owing to territorial, ethnic, i deological or economic disputes. Even big powers joined in under certain conditi ons (the Gulf War, for example). On the other hand, big powers¬ð nuclear deterre n ce seems rather ineffective in curbing regional hostilities, because few regiona l states believe big powers will use nuclear weapons against them in such contin gencies. If some of the smaller nations possess a few nuclear weapons, one or tw o of them may not be able to resist the temptation of using these under certain circumstances. As their nuclear stockpile is very small in scale and will exert lesser global influence, it is more likely for them than for bigger powers to us e it. I am not alleging that all big powers have strong sense of responsibility for global security, but we can not thus infer to the conclusion that increasing the number of nuclear weapon states will make the world safer. This is the rai son d¬ðetre for the NPT. Is nuclear deterrence indispensable for maintaining a global peace? The auth or argues that the need is diminishing. The world economy and trade are flourish ing vigorously. They have already transcended national boundaries and are integr ating nationª²states into a common market. The economic interdependence, albeit s till unequal in that stronger nations get more benefits, is creating a sphere of more or less common prosperity. Internationalizing the economy is becoming the common goal all nations strive for, because no country can make a fortune by clo sedª²doorism. The economic integration of nations has become so close that they can hardly be separated from each other. Should a war break out, both parties wo uld suffer heavily. So wars, especially nuclear wars, have become increasingly l ess likely. The European Economic Community and the Association of Southeast As ian Nations (ASEAN) are good examples of this economic interdependence. Here I d o not mean that nationalism no longer exists. It does exist as the antithesis of interdependence, and it is sometimes very strong. It is manifested often as a r eaction to inequality in bilateral relations in order to protect the national in terests. Nationalism will not inhibit the development of economic interdependenc e as long as the latter is beneficial to all parties. III. Nuclear Disarmament With the end of the Cold War and the breakª²down of the Soviet Union, internat i onal relations have been greatly relaxed. The United States no longer feels seri ously threatened by Russia (Soviet Union). The time is ripe for largeª²scale nuc l ear disarmament. In the process from nuclear weapon cut to its total elimination , the United States and Russia should take the lead because they own most of the nuclear arms in the world (over 95%). START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I) and START II between the two states specify that their strategic nuclear warh eads be reduced to 3000 to 3500 (two third cut) by 2003.5 Tactical nuclear wa rh eads will be mostly withdrawn. Despite these cuts, their nuclear arsenals will s till be formidable, more than enough for mutual destruction. It is the common de sire of the world that the two nuclear superpowers continue to dramatically cut their nuclear stockpiles, but the grim reality is that neither is ready to go fu rther in the process now, perhaps out of remnant Cold War mentality. As American hawks strongly resisted further reduction, President Clinton approved the reco mmendations of the Pentagon¬ðs Nuclear Posture Review of 1995 which proposed a l e vel of 3500.6 Russia also has little incentive to make its nuclear arsenal les s than 3000, because nationalism is rising there. Further nuclear cuts will depend on the United States for it is the only full superpower now. The 3000-3500 level is mainly determined by the need of a warª²f i ghting strategy. The time may arrive someday when there is greater confidence be tween the two and it will no longer be necessary to resort to nuclear warª²fight i ng to resolve their disputes. Then this strategy may shrink into one of pure det errence. That is, the United States would be prepared only for a retaliation sho uld Russia launch a nuclear attack against America. In this case, 1000 or less n uclear warheads will be adequate. At this level, other nuclear powers and thresh old states may be induced into the talks on total elimination of nuclear weapons . Such talks will be possible when nuclear arsenals of states concerned are comp arable. Absolute equality is not necessary. As a nuclear arms ban can¬ðt be realized in the near future, all nuclear weapo n states should make a commitment that they shall never be the first to use nucle ar weapons, nor shall they use or threaten to use them against nonª²nuclearª²w ea pon states or nuclearª²free zones under any conditions. China has repeatedly mad e such a pledge since its first nuclear explosion in 1964 and has formally propos ed a draft ¡°noª²firstª²use¡± treaty to the other four nuclear powers for consid erat ion in 1994. Such a commitment or treaty will contribute greatly to the preventi on of nuclear wars and the safeguard of world peace, and may be the best arrange ment we can make until a total ban treaty is signed. However, the United States has never agreed to adopt a full ¡°noª²firstª²use¡± policy. America did have a s trat egy of using nuclear weapons to thwart largeª²scale conventional attacks on West Europe by the Soviet military bloc during the Cold War. Now that the Cold War is over, no conventional forces are threatening the United States, so it is inadvi sable to continue the Cold War strategy. American attitude constitutes a major o bstacle to the noª²firstª²use initiative. The Soviet Union has been pledging no ª²fi rstª²use policy unequivocally for many years, but Russia denounced the pledge in 1993, giving no reason for the change. It is generally believed that Russia may consider using nuclear weapons to thwart conventional attacks with highª²technol o gy weapons (Russia lags behind in this area) by the United States. Russia should be urged to return to its former policy. IV. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban The comprehensive test ban (CTB) is another important step towards the total ba n of nuclear weapons and a complement to the NPT. However, it does not end nucl ear weapon development. A nation with adequate nuclear technology is capable of making crude fission bombs without conducting nuclear tests, while for building highly effective nuclear weapons and developing advanced new types (third genera tion) of nuclear weapons, testing is still necessary. For most of the world nat ions, CTB is unfair and discriminatory, too, because it helps the nuclear super powers to maintain their nuclear superiority. Nuclear test ban has become a world issue since 1954 when atmospheric nuclear explosions by the United States on Bikini Atoll in the Pacific created harmful radioactive fallouts and pollution. At that time, international pressure did no t succeed in halting nuclear tests conducted by the superpowers, because they were engaged in improving and developing their nuclear weapons and were unwi lling to stop all their testing. They, with the participation of Britain, con cluded in 1963 the Limited Test Ban Treaty which prohibited all but underground nuclear testing and in 1974 the Threshold Test Ban Treaty which limited the yie ld of underground tests to 150 kt of TNT equivalent. Up to the present, America has conducted 1030 nuclear tests and the Soviet Unio n 715.7 They have done enough to perfect their second generation nuclear weapo ns . Further testing will add little to the improvement of their existing nuclear w eapons. The third generation, like earth penetrating bombs and Xª²ray lasers, ne e ds more testing. But with the end of the Cold War, there is no longer immediate need for developing such sophisticated things. So in 1993 the United States star ted a testing moratorium which was subsequently joined by UK, France and Russia. China resumed nuclear testing in October of 1993, declaring that it has conduct ed the smallest number of nuclear tests of the five declared NWS, that the prese nt testing is purely for selfª²defense, and that it supports the early conclusio n through negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than 199 6 when its testing will be ended. China¬ðs testing was finished at the end of J u ly, 1996. France resumed nuclear testing in June 1995 and stopped in January 199 6. Britain had to use U.S.test site, so could not conduct more tests. A new round of negotiations on CTBT began early in 1994 in the Conference on D isarmament in Geneva and engaged representatives of 38 nations (later expanded t o 60), aiming at developing a draft of CTBT for the 51st UN General Assembly in September 1996. There were a lot of heated controversies over the content and wo rding. A major point is whether lowª²yield tests can be allowed. The issue arises fr o m the concern over the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons in stockp ile. The safety problem is whether a nuclear bomb can be set off in a lowª²y i eld explosion at a single point accidentally in a crash or a fire (oneª²point sa f ety). People are worried about whether stockpiled nuclear weapons will become u nreliable with time. Nuclear warheads contain organic materials and explosives that change with age, and also plutonium or uranium that corrode and have changi ng nuclear and chemical structures. They are assumed to have a life time of 15- 20 years and those in stockpile in the United States are on the average 13 years old. It is a question whether they will be reliable for use in the coming dec ades. In the past, whenever there were problems, a few samples were taken from the stockpile for testing to ensure the safety and reliability of the whole arse nal. If a CTBT is concluded, will the U.S. nuclear laboratories be able to ke ep the nuclear stockpile safe and reliable for decades to come? To ensure con fidence, the U.S. Department of Energy initiated a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program to predict, identify and correct problems affecting the safet y and reliability of the stockpile, relying on scientific understanding and exp ert judgment, not on testing. The nuclear labs, nevertheless, could not feel at ease. American representatives at the Conference on Disarmament insisted upon the ri ght to conduct hydronuclear experiments of 4 lbs. of TNT equivalent8 which, a lb eit very small, means that the CTBT becomes a threshold test ban treaty. This c aused difficulties in reaching agreement. Britain favored a level of 100 lbs. R ussia wanted at least 10 tons, and France argued for 100-200 tons. The threshold dispute became a stumbling block in the way to CTBT. Moreover, the U.S. offered a highly controversial proposal of ¡°easy exit¡± which means that a signatory ca n withdraw from the treaty 10 years after its conclusion. The proposal was final ly retracted, but the U.S. Defense Department wanted a reciprocal exchange for dropping the easy exit: raising the threshold yield to 500 tons which is the min imum yield for experiments on boostedª²fission weapons.9 President Bill Clin ton was thus in a dilemma: to support a CTB or just a threshold test ban. He was aw are that nuclear tests would not be stopped if the United States did not take th e lead in supporting a CTB. In 1995, the JASON Committee, an independent group of scientific advisors to the U.S. government, concluded that the United States can confidently maintain the safety and reliability of its nuclear stockpile under a ¡°zeroª²yield¡± CTB thro ugh the stockpile stewardship and management program. The lowª²yield tests are of marginal use according to the JASON report.10 Basing on this conclusion, Presid ent Clinton announced on August 11, 1995, that the United States would seek ¡°a t rue zero yield comprehensive test ban,¡± but he also said he ¡°would be prepared , in consultation with Congress, to exercise our supreme national interest rights under a comprehensive test ban to conduct necessary testing if the safety or rel iability of our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified.¡±11 With the cha nge of the U.S. attitude, a ¡°zeroª²yield¡± formulation in the CTBT text was soo n adopted. Besides this issue, many others existed, but they were resolved one by one. A CTBT draft was finally formulated. However, India was displeased with the draft , because the language it proposed concerning the total elimination of nuclear w eapons within a ¡°timeª²bound framework¡± was not accepted and the draft contain s a provision requiring the ratification by 44 states including India before the tr eaty enters into force. The objection of India and another state, Iran, prevent ed the draft from being sent to the UN General Assembly by the Conference on Dis armament for the lack of consensus. It was subsequently presented by Australia t o the UN General Assembly which approved the draft and opened it for signature i n September, 1996. Soon, the majority of UN member states signed the treaty, bu t India declined to do so. The treaty will not enter into force without India, n evertheless. India¬ðs attitude is a reaction to the unfairness of the CTBT. We don¬ðt kn ow exactly what will happen in the future. The matter may develop in three possibl e directions. First, India may change its mind and accept the treaty someday. Se cond, there may be a de facto test ban though India refuses to accede to the tre aty, because it finds it very difficult to conduct tests in face of almost unive rsal support of a global nuclear test ban. Third, India will conduct a few nucle ar tests, then stop and sign the CTBT. It is very improbable that India will con tinue its testing indefinitely under a strong international pressure. V. The Role of the United States From the foregoing discussion, we can see a history of American hegemony in the nuclear arms control. As is the common practice in international affairs, the United States used to give its national interests high priority. As it is t he only superpower in the present world, its international behavior inevitably b ears hegemonic character. It often brandished its nuclear weapons to intimidate its opponents, as it did against China during the Korean War. When more nuclea r weapon states were emerging, it initiated the NPT in an effort to stop the tr end. When the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union got out of control and became harmful to the United States, it began to engage actively in nuclear control negotiations. When the United States determined tha t it had conducted enough number of nuclear tests and further testing would only help other countries develop their nuclear weapons, it sought to achieve a glob al comprehensive test ban to guarantee its supremacy in nuclear arsenal. There fore the world seems to be powerless at the mercy of the only superpower. Pendi ng the establishment of an effective and just world government, the law of the j ungle will continue to have a sway in international politics. Fortunately, possessing the largest nuclear arsenal does not necessarily mak e a nation feel at ease. Owing to the ineffectiveness of the ballistic missile d efense, smaller NWS can inflict heavy losses on a nuclear superpower. As more NWS are emerging, the superpower seeks to achieve nuclear nonª²proliferation whi c h requires the superpower to provide nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes as an exchange. The personnel trained for a nuclear power plant can switch over to nuclear weapons development without much difficulty because the two technol ogies are basically the same. Nonª²proliferation creates conditions for prolife r ation. This is where the United States feels helpless. To cut down the dangero us surplus of nuclear stockpile accumulated during the arms race, the United Sta tes and the Soviet Union (Russia) had to negotiate with each other and concluded arms control treaties which in turn placed restraints on the nuclear weapon dev elopment of both sides. In order to achieve a CTBT, the United States has to ba rgain with its partners in negotiations and finally give up its lowª²yield defin i tion so that it will no longer be free to test once its nuclear stockpile¬ðs sa fety and reliability is in doubt. The United States is the most powerful and influential one of the five decla red NWS. Without its consent no international move in nuclear arms control can b e successful, but it can not do whatever it likes to do. It has to negotiate wit h other countries, especially the five NWSs on nuclear arms control affairs. Alt hough the results of talks are mostly more favorable to the U.S. than to other c ountries, it often has to make concessions to satisfy its partners in negotiatio ns. In the process of negotiations, the common longª²range goal for a world free of nuclear weapons will only be reached step by step. In conclusion, the U.S. nuclear policy is of a dual nature. Being the only w orld superpower, the United States uses its military power, including nuclear we apons, to coerce weaker nations into submission to its will on the one hand, and on the other, it is afraid of being attacked by nuclear weapons. As is remarked above, the tremendous superiority in nuclear strength does not give the only su perpower much assurance of security in a confrontation with a smaller NWS, let a lone the threat from the huge Russian nuclear arsenal. In this sense, the United States is willing to negotiate on nuclear arms reduction, nuclear nonproliferat ion and comprehensive nuclear test ban, provided they are not very unfavorable t o it self. Therefore we should cooperate with the United States whenever its beh avior is contributive to world peace and security. At the same time, it is also very important to combat its hegemonism, coerciveness, peremptoriness and whatev er is harmful to a good international relationship, and strive for results more beneficial to the majority of nations. NOTES 1 Waldo Stumpf, ¡°South Africa¬ðs Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence t o Dismantlement,¡± Arms Control Today, Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996, pp. 3-8. 2 Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (United States Arms Co ntrol and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 1980), p. 92. 3 ¡°An ACA Briefing on Indefinite NPT Extension and on the Moscow Summit,¡± Arms Control Today, June 1995, p. 14. 4 Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt, Brace , 1946), passim. 5 ¡°START,¡± Arms Control Today, Jan./ Feb. 1993, Supplement pp .5-8. 6 Bill Gertz, ¡°The New Nuclear Policy: Lead but Hedge¡±, Air Force Magazine , Jan. 1995, pp. 34-36. 7 ¡°Fifty Years of Nuclear Testing: Part II,¡± Arms Control Today, Sept. 1995, p. 38. 8 A fission (atomic) bomb is usually composed of a core of fissile materia l and a layer of highly explosive chemicals surrounding the core. When the highly explosive chemicals are set off by detonators, the core is compressed to supe rcritical mass and explodes. In hydronuclear experiments, cores contain only sm all amounts of fissile materials so that the resulting yields are as low as a fe w lbs, but are sufficient for learning the physical properties of the implosion process which can help develop a computer simulation code for reliable predict ions. 9 Boostedª²fission bombs are nuclear weapons with thermonuclear fuels such a s deuterium or tritium added to their fissile material cores. The large amount of neutrons thus produced during the chain reaction serve to significantly enhan ce the yields of fission bombs. 10 ¡°JASON Nuclear Testing Study,¡± Arms Control Today, Sept . 1995, pp. 34-35. 11 ¡°U.S. Will Insist on Ban on All Nuclear Arms Test Explosions,¡± (Tex t: Cl inton August 11 statement)(560), Bulletin, (United States Informatio n Service, Embassy of the United States of America, Beijing), EPF513 August 14, 1995, pp. 1 7-18.