
American Studies in China Vol.3, 1996


SINOげU.S.げJAPANESE RELATIONS

FROM THE TURN OF LAST CENTURY

TO THE TURN OF THIS CENTURY


――from the Chinese perspective


ZI Zhongyun


     From the turn of last century to the forthcoming turn of this 
century,  four major countries, namely, China, the United States, 
Japan and Russia have exercised decisive influence, in turn or 
concurrently, on the situation in the AsiaげPacific region and will 
continue to do so in the foreseeable future.  This includes both the 
course of development of these countries on their own and the interげ
relations among them.  Leaving aside Russia for the time being, this 
paper  mainly focuses on the relationship between China, America and 
Japan.  The reason for talking specifically “from a Chinese 
perspective” is that, since recently, there have been discussions at 
different levels among elite opinion circles both in Japan and the 
United States on the question of how to deal with a fastげgrowing and 
changing China.  A series of forums were also held between  Japanese 
and Americans and much has been published on the subject.  The views 
expressed thereby show a rather wide gap in perspective with that from 
China. Using this opportunity to take a look at the issue from a 
Chinese perspective to induce some discussions might help to promote 
mutual understanding.  It is understood that the views explored here 
are neither official nor the result of quantitative research on 
Chinese public opinion; but they do reflect by and large a prevailing 
consensus among broad social strata in China.

I. The First Four Decades from the Turn

of Last Century

SINOげU.S.げJAPANESE RELATIONS
American Studies in China
     In order to better understand Today, it is necessary to make a 
brief historical review.

     By the end of the 19th century, Japan was actively pursuing the 
“off Asia into Europe” policy, with the ambition of joining the power 
system centering around European imperialists and making aggressive 
attempts to expand its sphere of influence.  The neighboring China 
both vast in area and weak in strength naturally became its first 
target. Just at this moment, the United States began to cast its eyes 
beyond the Pacific Ocean.  Secretary John Hayюs Notes on “openげdoor” 
principle in 1899, could be regarded as the first US policy paper 
toward China (prior to this, from the “Wangsha Treaty” to the 
participation in the Eightげpower Allied Forces, America was only 
taking a “free ride” to China).  While applying to all powers in China 
in principle, the “openげdoor” policy was specifically targeted at 
Russia and Japan, the two countries most covetous of Northげeastern 
China.  Soon afterwards, the RussoげJapanese war broke out, and as a 
result, Japan obtained dominant position in that area and with the 
rapid growth of its strength and the rise of militarism, its ambitions 
inflated to include conquest of the whole of China. Logically, for the 
American “openげdoor” policy, Japan became the main challenger.

     Confronted with an aggressive Japan, the successive Chinese 
governments from the late Qing Dynasty, through Yuan Shikai, the 
Northern Warlords to the Nationalists were all too weak to protect 
themselves and invariably placed hope on the U.S. as a countervailing 
force against Japan, expecting that it would insist on its “openげdoor” 
policy.  It is fair to say that throughout this period, with only a 
few short exceptions, “seeking alignment with America to counter 
Japan” remained the main line of diplomatic thinking of almost all the 
Chinese governments.  But until shortly before the Pearl Harbor 
Incident, all these attempts had failed and the hopes pinned on the 
United States proved to be chimerical.  To cite a few examples: The 
“RootげTakahira Agreement” in 1908 shattered the Qing governmentюs 
attempt to break the Japanese monopoly of Manchuria by inviting 
Americans to join in the development of the area, so that Tang Shaoyi, 
Special Envoy to Washington to negotiate loans, returned emptyげhanded.  
The “Knox Plan” (named after the then US Secretary of State) about 
building  the JinzhouげAihui railway, a project which had been planned 
from the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China, fell through, due 
to combined opposition from Japan and Britain. The “LansingげIshii 
Agreement” signed between America and Japan in 1917 even went further 
to recognize Japanюs “special interests” in China.  What came as a 
shock to both the Chinese government and general public, and caused 
deep disappointment at the US was the “Paris Peace Conference” in 
1919, at which the most influential US delegation, following the 
personal directive of President Woodrow Wilson, conceded to Japanese 
imperialist claims against Chinaюs legitimate demands in the case of 
Shandong peninsula. This event precipitated the “May 4th Movement” 
which produced farげreaching impact on Chinaюs political life.  For 
China, the Washington Conference in 1922 was a favorable turn.  Under 
the US initiative, the “NineげPower Treaty” and later the “Briandげ
Kellogg Pact” were passed, which, to some extent, exercised constrain 
on Japan, and enabled China to recover part of its legitimate rights.  
After the “Northern Expedition” in 1926, the Nationalist government 
once hoped to establish good relations with America and Japan 
concurrently so as to develop Chinaюs economy with the help of both.  
But before long, the unprecedented Great Depression took place, 
hitting hard America and the entire capitalist world.  Managing hard 
to fend for itself, the US even transferred the crisis to China 
through the silver policy.  Against this background, the militarist 
forces swelled rapidly in Japan, and, never wanting to see China 
embarking on a road of healthy development, abruptly launched the 
“September 18 Incident” of 1931.

     After the Japanese seizure of Manchuria, Chiang Kaiげshek, like 
his predecessors, was unwilling to put up resistance and instead, 
counted on international intervention from America and the League of 
Nations.  Though not a member state of the League, Washington was a 
leading member of the NineげPower Treaty, so its attitude carried much 
weight.  This time, the U.S. took a relatively clearer position in the 
famous “Doctrine of Nonげrecognition” of Secretary Stimson.  After the 
“January 28 Incident” in 1932, in which Japan bombarded Shanghai, the 
U.S. insisted on revising the “Lytton Report” of the League of Nations 
to the effect that the policy of nonげrecognition was maintained, and 
the Japanese aggressive acts denounced.  But these were too late and 
too weak to curb Japanюs aggressive momentum, and the Japanese 
government responded by announcing in 1933 withdrawal from the League 
of Nations.  By then, the Japanese intention became crystal clear.  
However, as late as 1937, just on the eve of a fullげscale Japanese 
invasion into China, the US Congress adopted the “Permanent Neutrality 
Act” which in effect was to the advantage of Japan.

     The rationale for the American position in all these instances 
lay in the reality of the lopsided balance of strength between Japan 
and China, which made the United States feel not worthwhile to offend 
a strong Japan for the sake of a weak China.  Balancing its limited 
power and interests in Asia, America was not prepared then for a headげ
on confrontation with Japan.  The great economic depression of the 
late 1920s made Japan a more needed market.  With an illusion that the 
civilian forces in the Japanese government would prevail over the 
militarists in the end, most of the influential figures in the U.S. 
related to policyげmaking towards Japan were in favor of accommodation rat
her
 than hard pressure.  Moreover, there were bargaining counters between the two: 
America tolerated what Japan was doing in Korea and China in exchange 
for Japanюs refraining from touching the Philippines and ignoring 
American exclusion of Japanese immigrants. From the Chinese 
perspective, however, in every round of wrestling with Japan,  America 
stepped back from the “openげdoor” policy at the expense of Chinaюs 
rights and interests.  These circumstances not only deepened the 
heartfelt pains of the Chinese people, feeling like “being meat on 
othersю chopping block”,  but also swept away the hopes cherished by 
many Chinese on the United States, seen as the last benign Western 
power, and accelerated the awakening of the Chinese national 
consciousness.  Revolutionary leaders like Dr. Sun Yatげsen and Chen 
Duxiu, founder of the Communist Party, who had both been admirers of 
the United States, became completely disillusioned. This partly 
explained why large numbers of patriotic Chinese intellectuals 
embraced Marxism and turned to the Soviet Union during this period.


II.  From SinoげUS Alliance Against Japanese

Aggression to USげJapan Alliance

Against China in the Cold War


     In the early stage of the War of Resistance against Japan, the 
diplomatic efforts of the Chiang KaiげShek government aimed at 
obtaining US help, and through the US influence, a joint constraining 
of Japan from the international community.  Specifically, it aimed at 
getting the US to abolish the “Permanent Neutrality Act” and provide 
economic aid to China. But these efforts produced very little effect.  
After 1938, the American public became increasingly sympathetic with 
Chinaюs war efforts, and the inclination of the US government also 
began to change, though gradually and slowly. Regular US aid did not 
come to China until March 1941 after the decision to include China in 
the “LendげLease Act”.  After Pearl Harbor, the situation took a Uげ
turn.  America wanted China to pin down as many Japanese forces as 
possible so that itself could concentrate on the battleground in 
Europe, while Chiang Kaiげshek took a great relief and counted on the 
US to fight Japan so that he could preserve his forces against the 
communists.  This contradiction of intentions gave rise to the wellげ
known “Stilwell Incident”.  It is to be noted that in order to 
encourage China to hold out against Japan, the Roosevelt 
administration supported Chinaюs claim to recover all the Japaneseげ
occupied territories after the war, and got this officially written 
into the “Cairo Declaration” and the “Potsdam Proclamation”.  At the 
same time, it also actively promoted the recognition of Chinaюs status 
as a big power so that China became a founding member of the United Nations as w
ell as a 
permanent member of the Security Council.  This was the only period in 
history when China and America formed an alliance against Japan.  
During the war against Japan, the Communist Party of China grew into a 
force to be reckoned with, and for the first time in history, it came 
to the American attention on policy level.  For a short moment, the 
Chinese communists had good impressions of the Roosevelt 
administration and cherished hope that: one, the U.S. would also provide aid 
to the communistげled antiげJapanese forces; and two, the US would use 
its influence to prevent the Kuomintang from launching a civil war, or 
at least remain neutral in Chinaюs internal strife.  But both hopes 
fell apart and the subsequent development of history was known to all, 
including the leftげover of the “Taiwan issue”.

     After the War, America exclusively occupied Japan.  General 
MacArthur, acting like an overlord, took in his hands the power which 
could determine Japanюs destiny.  Theoretically, America was occupying 
Japan on behalf of the Allies, with the responsibility of uprooting 
militarist forces from all areas and preparing for the peace treaty.  
In the early stage of the occupation, the U.S. was quite successful in 
transforming Japan along this line. The current Constitution of peace 
and the political system of Japan are, for example, the products of 
the transformation.  But as the Cold War intensified and the victory 
of the Chinese Communist Party was in sight, there was a major shift 
in the U.S. Asia policy in 1948 towards making Japan a Cold War 
partner against the Soviet Union and China. The immediate consequence 
of this strategic shift was that China, which had contributed most to 
the war efforts and suffered the greatest sacrifice was not 
represented at the San Francisco Conference for Peace Treaty with 
Japan.   As a result, Chinaюs voices were not heard and the atrocities 
of Japanese militarists  not fully exposed.  Since then, Japan became 
totally dependent on the US politically and on security issues; but it 
also took the opportunity to develop a very strong economy and finally 
became a formidable competitor of the US, so much so that trade 
frictions have become a part of JapaneseげUS relations today.  A byげproduct 
of the American Cold War policy was that some militarist elements as 
well as their thinking kept their influence in Japan.  This was very 
different from the way Fascism has been treated in Europe.  In the 
postげwar era, German leaders never defended the crimes committed by 
the Nazis.  But until today, quite influential politicians and opinion 
circles in Japan are still ambiguous about its aggressive history in 
Asia.  Every now and then, there were “slips of the tongue” by 
Japanese political figures which would arouse indignant protests from 
Asian peoples.

     Regarding SinoげJapanese relations during the Cold War,  it goes 
without saying that the Japanese government  could not independently 
develop relations with China so long as USげChina relations remained 
deadlocked.  But things were different on nonげgovernmental level.  In 
late 1950s and early 1960s, antiげAmerican sentiments were on the rise 
among Japanese public and opposition parties.  Pro or antiげAmerica 
became a demarcation line between Japanese right and left.  Giving 
allowance to certain exaggeration  in the Chinese propaganda about the 
antiげAmerican movements in Japan, this phenomenon remained a fact.  
During the War with Japan, the Chinese Communist Party established an 
alliance with the Japanese Left and antiげwar forces, which became the 
basic force in postwar Japan for the promotion of nonげgovernmental 
relationship with the Peopleюs Republic of China. Trade relations with 
small and mediumげsized Japanese enterprises progressed very well.  At 
one stage, “America is the common enemy of the Chinese and Japanese 
people” became a common slogan.  Japanese politician Asanuma Inejiro 
was even assassinated by ultraげrightists for his insistence on the 
slogan.  Thus, when the opportunity came, normalization of Sinoげ
Japanese official relations were realized rather smoothly because it 
had been promoted from under by nonげofficial circles, and was 
therefore broadly based.

     Looking back, SinoげUSげJapanese relations in most part of the 
history had always been abnormal and unequal.  It seemed as though 
America would always have to make a choice between China and Japan, 
and China saw itself as victim under whatever circumstances.  
Fundamental changes did not take place until the 1970s.

III.  After the Normalization of Relations

     The normalization of SinoげUS and SinoげJapanese relations began in 
1970s with Mao Zedongюs PingげPong diplomacy and Nixonюs visit to 
China.  Since then, for the first time in history a situation emerged 
in which the three countries could get along harmoniously with each 
other, and none would have to choose between the other two.  Arising 
from common needs, this was in the best interests of all three 
countries.   Among other things, two factors were most important:  
one, common interest in countering the perceived Soviet threat. and 
two, Chinaюs modernization drive.  The first point was too obvious to 
need any elaboration here.  With regard to the second point, in the 
late 1970s China resolutely took the road of reform and openingげup, 
with modernization as the national goal. For the fulfillment of this 
goal, America and Japan stood out naturally as the two most important 
countries for China to turn to not only in capital, technology and 
trade, but also in expertise, thinking and personnel training.  In the 
early 1980s when the Chinese people talked about modernization, they would 
naturally think of America and Japan, placing high or rather excessive 
expectations on both countries. America and Japan on their part, 
welcomed, and even hailed, in Americaюs case, the changes taking place 
in China.  Out of strategic, economic and ideological considerations, 
they believed encouraging and helping China to stick to reform and 
openげup was in their own interests.  At that time, trade friction had 
already emerged between Japan and America, while China was just 
starting its economic development and was far from being a competitor.  
So both countries would like to see a better relationship with China.  
Under these circumstances, the problems left over by the hostile 
history between China and the other two countries were relatively easy 
to manage either by reaching compromise or shelving them temporarily. 
Quite a number of Americans got excited again, forming unrealistic 
expectations on changes in China to their liking and overげestimating the 
capability of US influence on Chinaюs course of development. 

     After the 1989 political upheaval in China, the American views on 
China shifted dramatically.  For the first two years, there was 
expectation that China would give up reform and openげup, and return 
to the rigid and secluded past.  Following the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union and the drastic changes in Eastern Europe, there was 
anticipation or even hope for a collapse of the current regime led by 
the Communist Party and different policy proposals tantamount to a 
return to the “isolation and containment” policy were advocated.  But 
this only lasted for a short while and did not become the mainstream 
of U.S. China policy, for American policy makers soon came to realize 
that China was different from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, 
that the current regime would not collapse, and that a stable China 
was in the interests of the US itself and world peace.  Therefore, in 
spite of the chronicle MFN crisis created by the US Congress, reason 
always prevailed and finally a decision was made by the Clinton 
Administration to delink the issue from that of “human rights”.  In 
this respect, Japanюs attitude was less dramatic because its diplomacy 
was not so heavily ideological as that of the U.S.  Moreover, during 
that time it was caught up in serious trade disputes with America, 
while enjoying a favorable trade balance with China. Therefore, 
although politically Japan kept in step with the Western countries on 
human rights issues concerning China, it remained lukewarm towards 
measures of sanctions.

     A turning point came in 1992 with Deng Xiaopingюs speeches during 
his tour to southern China, in which China once again showed to the 
world its determination to march forward along the road of reform and 
openげup.  At the same time, Chinaюs economic growth gathered momentum.  
Now the perceptions of America and other countries towards China took 
another big turn: from anticipating its collapse to worrying about its 
potential strength.

IV.  Looking from the Present into the Future

     Where is and whither SinoげUSげJapanese relationship? Analysis on 
this question can be approached on two levels:  one is the objective 
and practical level as matters normally should be.  On this level, the 
factors for the three countries to maintain fairly good relations 
outnumber the ones leading to conflicts and the situation of the 1980s 
should be able to be maintained.  Chinaюs fundamental aspirations of 
stability, prosperity and development will stand unchanged.  As facts 
since late 1970s have proved, the road of reform and openげup is 
irreversible, whatever twists and turns should happen domestically; 
externally, Chinaюs behavior has been cautious and responsible and as 
a whole, ideological factor is on the wane. For China, the role that 
can be played by America and Japan in its modernization will become 
ever more important.  To America and Japan, the repeated statements 
that a stable, prosperous and friendly China is in their interests are 
not just diplomatic clichｅ.  Japan is particularly concerned about 
Chinaюs stability, and America has a greater need of Chinaюs coげ 
operation in world affairs.  The everげincreasing crossげborder problems 
such as antiげdrugs, antiげpollution and antiげterrorist activities and 
all kinds of common issues concerning human subsistence and health 
make coげoperation among the three countries a great necessity.  There 
are, of course, factors which might lead to frictions:  trade 
friction, a major issue between U.S. and Japan, also occurs between 
America and China.  In fact, for a long time to come China will lag 
behind America and Japan in the stage of development and will not 
constitute a strong competitor.  There are other differences emerging 
regularly, which, if treated with reason and not to be affected by 
ideological and emotional factors or by domestic politics, could be 
approached appropriately and reach compromise through proper channels.

     Here I would focus on the second level--the level of perception.  
This is more problematic because there has been a wide gap between how 
China perceives itself and its relations with the outside world on the 
one hand and how it is perceived by the outside world on the other. 
(The theme of this paper being SinoげUSげJapanese relations, “outside 
world” here mainly refers to the US and Japan, not including other 
countries ).  At present there is a variety of thesis concerning  
Chinaюs role in Asia and the Pacific region. Out of these there is a 
general demonstration of misgivings, as if China were a “problem 
child” on the international arena who should be guarded against. As 
always, the United States is on the forefront and is accustomed to be 
the most outspoken.  Recently American “Council on Foreign Relations” 
published a book on China whose title alone is meaningful: “Weaving 
the Net”.  Its theme is highlighted on the cover with a Chinese 
proverb: “better to go back and weave a net, than to covet for fish by 
the riverside”.  The  subheading of the book is “Conditional 
Engagement with China”.  The following paragraph reads particularly 
representative of this school of thoughts:

  “China may pose a serious problem for the rest of the world 
regardless of which trajectory it follows.  If the PRC disintegrates, 
the mass social chaos and human suffering could well result in waves 
of refugees, rampant crime, weapons and nuclear arms proliferation, 
and staggering economic losses.  If China remains united and strongly 
authoritarian, a coalition of  party ideologies, state capitalists, 
and xenophobic Peopleюs Liberation Army (PLA) officers could gather 
the reins of power in Beijing while constructing a new legitimacy 
based on Han nationalism and an aggressive foreign policy.  If China 
remains united and mildly authoritarian, it could well become a 
destablizing force in the international system, and in any case would 
still be difficult to deal with--as Washington has lately discovered.  
However, even a pluralist, quasiげdemocratic China, given its sheer 
size, the volatility of its domestic politics, and the depth of its 
aggrieved nationalism, would pose an enormous problem.”1

     According to this line of logic, no matter how China evolves, the 
impact it creates would be negative.  The existence of China itself 
would pose difficulties to the world.  This is of course only one 
school of thought and there are other Americans who make more positive 
appraisals on the prospect of China.  But the viewpoints as quoted 
above are by no means isolated and  The U.S. Council on Foreign 
Relations which organized the discussion and published the book enjoys 
considerable authority. Besides, many other views differ from this one 
only in nuances not in essence.  Concerns and misgivings about Chinaюs 
development are common.  So, apart from the officially declared policy 
of “constructive engagement”, there appears a proposed policy of 
“conditional engagement”. Ostensibly all the conditions raised are 
those that all parties should abide by, such as: “no unilateral use of 
offensive military force”, “peaceful resolution of territorial 
disputes”, “freedom of navigation”, “market access for trade and 
investment”, “nonげproliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, 
“respect for basic human rights” and so on.  But given the context in 
which these conditions are raised and the problems in the practice of 
SinoげUS relations over recent years, particularly Chinaюs reactions to 
Li Denghuiюs visit to America since last year, these conditions are 
apparently designed to constrain China.

     Similar views are also held in Japan to a large extent only with 
different emphasis and forms of manifestation. Objectively speaking, 
some of the concerns are understandable: Any movement of a country 
with 1.2 billion population possessing nuclear weapons and developing 
at the present momentum would naturally draw attention from the 
outside world. This is particularly true when the Chinese society is 
in the process of a deepげgoing transformation with all the 
unpredictable and uncontrollable elements one would expect of a huge 
ship making sharp turns. It is quite normal for China to be an object 
of study and concern.  But among the Chinese , there is a growing 
feeling of being treated unfairly.  There are wide gaps in perceptions 
which can be summed up in the following:

     (1)  On the question of Chinaюs strength: As Chinese see it, for 
over a hundred years, this country was so weak and backward that it 
had been time and again bullyed by foreign powers. A wealthy and strong 
motherland has been  the deeplyげcherished aspiration of the Chinese for 
generations.  In the past, due to various factors, both imposed upon 
and selfげinflicted, this goal remained a far off dream.  The momentum 
of rapid growth only came in the last decade or so and even now China 
is still far behind not only the developed but some newly 
industrialized thirdげworld countries and areas.  At present, it is 
still confronted with many restrictions in terms of sustainable 
development. The road of development is by no means plainげsailing and 
requires strenuous efforts.  But the outside world is already feeling 
uneasy about its progress.  They either overげestimate Chinaюs economy 
or, out of other considerations, refuse to treat China as a developing 
country.  This is the fundamental reason for the protracted 
negotiations on Chinaюs membership of the World Trade Organization. 

     In the military field,  though modernization of national defence 
is one of the declared objectives of the “four modernizations”, in 
fact, China made economic development a top priority and defence 
expenditure has been  kept at a very low level.  In absolute figures, 
it is much less than that of Japan whose defence development is 
restricted by the Constitution; proportionately it is far below that 
of America and other developed countries.  Authoritative American 
research reports also acknowledge that qualitatively Chinese military 
equipments are far from being modernized.  But Chinaюs military 
strength has been a subject of concern and any slight increase in its 
defence budget would arouse suspicions.

     (2)  On territorial claims. From the Chinese point of view, China 
has never had territorial ambitions outside its boundary. On the 
contrary, it has always been losing territorial rights to foreign 
powers in modern history.  The Taiwan issue is a legacy of this 
history. Therefore to reunify with Taiwan is the legitimate demand 
within Chinaюs sovereign rights.  Peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
issue is the basic policy; but China does not commit itself to giving 
up other means under any circumstances.  This position is interpreted 
as “having the intention of changing the status quo by force” and 
hence has become a major argument for the thesis of “China threat” and the 
“Taiwan Strait crisis” from last year to this year aggravated the 
allegations.  From Chinaюs standpoint, however, the whole event had 
not been started by China which had never taken the initiative to 
change the status quo. On the contrary, the actions it had taken were 
only compelled by necessity in order to stop the move towards  “two Chinas” wh
ich will change the status quo.  It is also Chinaюs belief that Japan and 
America should not only be held responsible historically for the 
issue, but are also relevant today and America, in particular, has 
still certain leverage on the issue. The difference over Taiwan is a 
difficult issue in the bilateral relations between China and America 
and is called by many a “time bomb”.  Japan basically shared the 
American position, only less visible, being not in the forefront.

     (3) Frictions between China and Japan take place frequently over 
the question of how to look at the history of Japanese aggressive war. 
This is not only an issue between China and Japan, but also involves 
other Asian countries. A verdict had already been passed on this 
period of history, and this generation of Japanese leadership was not 
held responsible.  They should, instead, turn this page of history 
over and establish a new relationship with other Asian countries on a 
new basis.  However, there is always a strong force in Japanese ruling 
circles trying to deny the fact of aggression, hence the recurrent 
statements to this effect and “text book” incidents. So much so that 
even on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the victory of 
antiげfascist war, the Japan Diet failed to seize the opportunity to 
pass a clearly worded resolution so that this page could be turned 
once for all.  The recent move of Prime Minister Hashimoto taking the 
lead to pay official tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine cannot but be 
regarded by the Asian peoples as a very serious signal of the 
orientation of Japanese political development. Japan has the 
legitimate right to wish to be an “ordinary country” in the 
international community and acquire a status that suits its present 
strength; but the attitude of present leaders toward history,  the 
philosophies advocated thereby as well as the education given to the 
younger generation constitute a constant concern for people of China 
and other Asian countries. The Chinese also feel that American opinion 
and the West as a whole approach this question differently from what 
they do to the atrocities of fascist Germany.  Some even blamed China 
of digging up old historical scores, which deepened the Chinese sense 
of being treated unfairly.

(4) On integration with the international community. China has 
been striving to be a full participant in the international community 
and is trying hard to integrate with the outside world in every 
aspect. America and Japan also believe that encouraging China to 
advance toward this direction would benefit all; but there is a great 
difference over the terms of achieving this end. Chinaюs muchげ
postponed development makes it a lateげcomer. The environment it finds 
itself in, with respect to access to technologyげtransfer and market 
for example, is much harsher than Japan and the “four dragons” of Asia 
at the time of their taking off. Added to this is outside 
pressure from ideological factor. The rules of many international 
organizations had been made in Chinaюs absence, without taking into 
account the specific conditions of China. Besides, many domestic 
factors are beyond control in the transition to a market economy. As 
China sees it, it has tried its utmost to meet the international 
requirements short of damaging its fundamental national interest; yet 
other countries headed by the United States seem never to be 
satisfied. Thus, whatever the arguments put forward by the U.S. in 
the WTO negotiations, looking at the situation from the Chinese 
perspective, by raising conditions beyond Chinaюs capability, the 
United States is placing obstacles in practice in contradiction to its 
professed principle of encouraging China to participate in the 
international community.

(5) There are deepげlying theoretical differences too. While 
acknowledging the general trend of globalization and increasing 
interdependence between nations, the Chinese theoretical circles still 
take national sovereignty as the foundation of state relations, and 
hold that power politics and interference into other countryюs 
internal affairs are to be opposed. In the West, however, there is an 
increasing emphasis on the obsolescence of the old concept of national 
sovereignty, the respect for “internal affairs” is deemphasised and 
“nationalism” often carries a negative connotation. This difference 
of concept stems from difference in posture, with China on the 
defensive and America on the offensive. China sees itself in the 
process of growing to its full national stature while the United 
States, assuming world leadership, regards the measures of other 
countries to protect their national interests as obstacles to its 
wielding its influences. Having said this, it should be acknowledged 
that compared with a few years ago, nationalist sentiments mainly 
targeted against America are on the rise both among ordinary Chinese 
and elite opinion circles. This is at least partly a repercussion to 
the U.S. way of dealing with China in the recent years seen by the 
Chinese as unequal treatment and playing power politics.

   In sum, for Chinese themselves, the momentum of development has 
just started. The hope is seen on the horizon; but there is still a 
long way to go before China can sit as an equal with developed 
countries and secure a fairly comfortable life for its 1.2 billion 
people. It requires, on the one hand, the arduous efforts of the Chinese 
people themselves, and, on the other, a favorable international 
environment. To put it graphically: though Chairman Mao Zedong 
proclaimed in 1949 that “Chinese people stand up from now on”, for a 
fairly long time, the Chinese people did not feel that they had stood 
straight up. Now that China has barely begun to stretch its back, the 
outside world is already warning against its growing too tall and 
talking of putting a ceiling on its head, as if the height China is 
allowed to grow differs from that of others. This leaves a feeling of 
unfairness and frustration on the part of the Chinese people, a mood 
which, in turn, is called “aggrieved nationalism” and regarded as a 
dangerous sign. How this vicious interaction is to be stopped is a 
question worthy of attention. What has been talked about above is not 
the decisionげmaking thinking of the three governments; but it is at 
least representative enough to influence decisionげmaking.

   The current relationship between Japan and the U.S. is markedly 
closer than that between anyone of the two with China respectively.  
Trade frictions between America and Japan will continue to present 
themselves and sometimes may become quite acute; but they are unlikely 
to cause crisis. The contradictions between America and Japan are 
normal ones stemming from national interests with no ideological and 
sentimental factors attached. There has been much talk about China 
and Japan being part of the Confucian culture; but in fact, the value 
system that actually works in Japan is closer to that of the West. In 
addition, on security issues, America and Japan remained allies in 
this postげcold war era, and the recently renewed USげJapanese Security 
Treaty, especially associated with the Taiwan issue, has caused 
justifiable concern on the part of the Chinese. America and Japan 
often consult with each other on their policies toward China in order 
to take concerted actions, whereas this mechanism does not exist in 
Chinaюs relationship with any of the other two respectively. So at 
present, the trilateral relationship is an unequilateral triangle.

   If this article focuses more on differences so as to catch 
attention and promote communications, the author does not deny that 
there exists broad basis for common interests. Despite all the 
problems explored above, SinoげUSげJapanese relations in the runげup to 
the 21st century are enjoying much more dynamic and healthier basis 
than any time since the turn of this century. This is because all 
three countries have undergone great changes in the latter half of the 
20th century, among which the most fundamental ones took place in 
China. For the first time in history, while discussing issues of the 
region, Chinaюs presence and opinions cannot be overlooked. This 
might be what the outside world is not accustomed to, but is precisely 
the basis upon which an equal and healthy relationship between the 
three countries can be built as well as a major factor for regional 
stability. No matter what contradictions may arise, a pattern in 
which two countries line up against the third will be unlikely to 
emerge. Policy makers of the three parties have realized that this is 
not only unwise, but infeasible. The positive significance of this 
situation has yet to be fully assessed. But we should not lose sight 
of the danger brought about by irrational factors caused by the gap of 
perceptions explored in this article and by the possible vicious 
circle it could trigger off. It is superfluous to stress the 
importance of SinoげUSげJapanese relations to peace and development of 
the AsiaげPacific region. Therefore, it is not only worthwhile but 
imperative for all concerned to make efforts toward a benign 
development of this relationship. Besides identifying each othersю 
real interests and trying to keep them coげordinated, the United States 
and Japan should learn to be accustomed to a growing China and treat 
it calmly as an equal. China, on its part, should give more caution 
to the possible repercussions of its words and deeds, avoid sending 
signals which might be misinterpreted, and try to make the positive 
impact of Chinaюs development on the AsiaげPacific region better 
understood. It is also of vital importance that China should deepen 
its reform along a healthy direction in order to catch up, both in 
perception and in practice, with the ever flowing trends 
of the world.

NOTES

1James Shinn, ed., Weaving The Net: Conditional Engagement with Chin
a, (Council on Relations Press, 1996), 
pp.5げ6.

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