#? #P[80]&#A*FAmerican^ Studies^ in^ China^ #FKVol.1#FS,^ 1994/_@#a$#P[100] #J[-50] #T3PAPER TIGER OR REAL TIGER:$ AMERICA'S NUCLEAR DETERRENCE$ AND MAO ZEDONG'S RESPONSE#t #T4HE Di#t$ #T4I.__ A Puzzle#t The effects of American nuclear threats in ending the Sino-American  confrontation in Korea and the Taiwan Straits have puzzled the scholarly  community. U.S. policy-makers regarded the atomic bomb as the ultimate  solution to crises and believed that this nuclear deterrence  was the major factor in forcing the CCP to  compromise and end these crises. This issue has become the subject of  academic debates as well. Those who believe in nuclear deterrence use  the Chinese example as proof of the strategy's effectiveness and  argue that it has become an effective tool for U.S. diplomacy in  solving crisis. Those who oppose the theory also use the Chinese  example to show that the atomic bomb cannot change the nature of the  international relations, that the use of nuclear deterrence in  diplomacy can only lead to a nuclear arms race and nuclear proliferation. What is the  true story about China? According  to Chinese archives available now and author's interviews with those  who used to work directly under Mao or to be involved in the policy- making, this paper will try to answer this and other related question.$ #T4II. "A Paper Tiger"#t Mao made his first comments on atomic bombs immediately after America  dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On the morning of  August 10, 1945, Mao summoned Hu Qiaomu (then editor-in-chief  of the #FKLiberation Daily#FS), and spent an  hour criticizing his and his colleagues' "bourgeois" attitude towards the atomic bomb.  Mao was deeply worried and dissatisfied with the Daily's coverage of  the bomb and felt that he had to intervene immediately.#+[1]$ Mao thought, "the propaganda organ of the United States  and Chiang Kai-shek hoped to sweep away the Red Army's political  influence with two atomic bombs."  Three days later, he went on to complain that some comrades showed  "even less judgment than a British peer, Lord Mountbatten, who said  the worst possible mistake was to think that the atomic bomb can  decide the war."#+[2]_ He noticed that after U.S. detonation  of the bomb, the Soviet Union and other big powers were competing with  the U.S. in developing their atomic bombs as well,  he mentioned that if many  countries had the atomic bomb, a nuclear war would be unlikely to  break out.#+[3]$ #M1Paper Tiger or Real Tiger#m #M2American Studies in China#m In August 1946, Mao met the American journalist Anna Louise Strong  in Yan'an. When asked about the possibility of U.S. nuclear attack  against the Soviet Union, Mao said for the first time in a rather vivid  language: "The atomic bomb is a paper tiger with which the U.S.  reactionaries try to terrify the people. It looks terrible but in  fact is not. Of course, the atomic bomb is a weapon of mass Šdestruction, but the outcome of war is decided by the people, not by  one or two new weapons." Mao suspected if the atomic bomb would  ever be used again in warfare. Mao said "It is the great bursting over  Hiroshima that destroyed it(nuclear bomb). The people of the whole world  have turned against it." He concluded with confidence: "In the end,  the bomb will not destroy the people. The people will destroy the  bomb." $ #T4III. Mao's Response to American Nuclear Threats$ During the Korean War#t According to Professor Roger Dingman's study, the U.S. government discussed and indeed made nuclear threats five  times during the Korean war. They fell under three stages. The first stage  was before China's entry into the Korean war. In July 1950, the Truman  Administration discussed and took measures twice designed to  prevent Chinese intervention with threats of  nuclear weapons. The second stage was when China had entered the war,  won the first campaign, and were preparing for the second campaign.  In December 1950, the Truman Administration openly used  nuclear threats which gave rise to strong international reactions. In  April of the following year, the Truman Administration once again  discussed the issue of using the atomic weapons against China and  Korea. The third stage was during 1952 and early 1953 when  the armistice negotiations were in a stalemate. During the NSC  meetings in April and May, the U.S. government once again discussed the  possibility of using atomic weapons against China and Korea. On May  20, Eisenhower approved a plan to prepare for a nuclear strike. It  also used open and diplomatic channels to bring pressure on Beijing in order to  end the Korean war sooner.#+[4]$ U.S. nuclear threats, however, did not have the intended effects in  China. In the first place, the threats were based on the wrong  judgment that China  would like to enter the war, and that the CCP would take  advantage of U.S. involvement in the northern war and wage a massive  attack against Taiwan. The fact was that the Chinese leaders  were not militarily prepared for the  war.$ Second, U.S. nuclear threats did not deter Mao from deciding  to enter the war. At the ninth meeting of the  Central People's Government Council on September 5, Mao said, "If the U.S. had to start the war and impose the  war on the Chinese people, we would have no choice but to reciprocate  the fight. They can fight the war their way and we our way. They can  use their atomic bombs and we can use our hand grenades. In the end,  we will beat them."#+[5]$ The U.S. landing at Inch'on on September 15 dramatically changed the war  in Korea. On October 1, Kim asked the CCP Central Committee to send  troops to support North Korea. Stalin also hoped China would assist Kim  by intervening in the war, or allow Kim to form a  government in exile in China.#+[6]_ Mao then convened a series of  Politburo meetings at which most of the members expressed opposition to  entering the war. The major reason was that there was such a huge  difference in strength between China and the U.S. Therefore, Mao  believed that during the first stage of the war, China should conduct  a defensive war north of the 38th Parallel to get better information about Šthe war while "awaiting Soviet weapons to arrive  so that we could coordinate with our Korean comrades in  staging a counterattack to destroy the U.S. invading forces."#+[7]_ According  to Mao's plan, China needed to group four armies and 2,200-3,000 7  cm or larger guns to besiege and destroy one U.S. army. This called for  rapid  Soviet aid and particularly, Soviet air  protection.#+[8]_ The Soviet Union at the time agreed to these conditions.  On October 8, Mao informed Kim that China had decided to  send troops to Korea. He also gave the order to the Chinese Voluntary  Army (CVA). Zhou was in the Soviet Union then negotiating with Stalin  about Soviet air support and arms supply. Quite unexpectedly, Stalin  expressed his worry that if the Soviet Union provided direct air  support, the Soviet air force would be likely to be engaged in a direct  fight with the United States, leading to an escalated war. He  therefore withdrew his air cover promise and only agreed  to provide arms supply for 20 divisions. On receiving  Zhou's October 10 report, Mao became worried about the  prospect of fighting a large-scale ground war without air support. On October 12, Mao  ordered postponing the time to enter Korea.$ After repeated discussions within the Politburo, it became clear that  if China did not enter the war, Kim would retreat into China's  northeast to engage in guerrilla warfare. As Mao said to Zhou in his  telegram, "it would be bad to all sides (China, Korea, the East and  the world) if the enemy pushed to the Yalu River. It would be  particularly bad to northeast China. The whole border defense force  would be bogged down. The power supply in southern northeast China would be  under enemy control."#+[9]_ After weighing the pros and cons, the Politburo  unanimously concluded that China would still send troops to Korea even  without Soviet air support. On October 19, the CVA crossed the Yalu  River and entered Korea.$ Between October 25 and November 5, 1950, the CVA fought and won the  first battle after entering Korea. Only after this did U.S. realize  that large numbers of Chinese troops had entered the war. On October  30, Truman  declared to reporters that he would take "whatever steps are necessary " to deal with the situation and indicated that the use of nuclear  weapons had "always been [under] active consideration." He then added  that the military commanders in the field would be "in charge of " their use.#+[10]_ Truman's statement caused a diplomatic crisis. Allied  capitals, London especially, were deeply apprehensive, seeing in  Truman's words a possible portent of World War III. British Prime Minister Attlee flew to  Washington in person and got Truman's reassurances to  keep him informed of "the developments which might bring  about a change in the situation."#+[11]_ On December 6, U.S. Army  Chief of Staff Gen. J. L. Collins had  to announce that the U.S. had no intention to use the atomic bomb in  Korea.$ What impact did the nuclear threats  have on China? First of all, they did not stop the Chinese from  executing its plan to conduct the second campaign which  had already started. When the campaign ended on December 24, the ŠChinese and North Korean armies had driven the UN forces back to south  of the 38th Parallel. While the second campaign was still under way, Mao  ordered Peng to start to organize the third campaign  with the aim of pushing to 37th Parallel and liberating Seoul.  In that case, China would be in an advantageous position should armistice  negotiations begin. Second, Chinese  leaders were indeed worried about the possible psychological impact of  these nuclear threats on their forces. They were aware of "the  relative spread of fear about the atomic bomb in Chinese  urban areas."#+[12]_ In order to keep soldiers' morale and overcome people's  fear, CCPCC launched a propaganda campaign. As early as October,  CCPCC had already pointed out that  "Atomic bomb is not monopolized by the U.S. and cannot determine the end  of a war. The bomb's effects would be limited in terms of China's vast size and  thinly spread population."#+[13]_ Third and perhaps most importantly, the  Attlee and Truman differences on the use of the atomic bomb made the  CCP realize that there was a lack of consensus among the U.S. and its allies  on the issue. To the CCP leaders, this restricting factor from its own allies  was a major reason why U.S. was unlikely to use the atomic bomb in the  war.#+[14]$ Compared with Truman's nuclear threats, the role of Eisenhower's in  ending the Korean war is an even more controversial issue among  historians. Eisenhower himself was convinced of the role nuclear  threats played. In his memoirs and talks with his aides, he claimed  that the reason for China to finally agree to the Korean armistice  agreement was the "danger of an atomic war...."#+[15]$ Some scholars thought there is a causal relationship between U.S. nuclear  threats and the armistice agreement. Others, however, including the then Assistant Secretary  Dean Rusk, disagreed or raised doubts about this assessment,  pointing out that China's agreement to the resumed negotiations preceded U.S.  nuclear threats.#+[16]_ But none of them had convincing arguments.  To answer the questions, we are now to review  China's principles guiding the armistice  negotiations and how China coordinated its action with negotiations.$ In the first place, Mao Zedong had a limited purpose in sending the troops  to Korea, i.e., to localize the Korean conflict.  After the five campaigns, Mao was well aware that  neither side had the strength to achieve an all-round victory in  the war and that the conflict could only be solved through  negotiations.$ Second, in order to solve the Korean problem through negotiations, Mao  adopted the principle of "fighting and talking at the same time" and  "using fighting to promote talking."#+[17]_ Kim and Mao decided in  Beijing on June 3, 1951 on the general principle of "being well- prepared for a protracted war while trying to end the war through  negotiations."#+[18]$ Third, the overriding principle was to be prepared  for a protracted war while trying to fight a short war. But this was impossible because of the huge difference in  technology and equipment between China and the United States.  The United States would be forced to accept  negotiations only when it suffered large losses. Mao realized that with a  protracted war there would be changes within the enemy. The anti-war Šmovement in the U.S. and its allies would develop. This would put more  political pressure on the United States and strengthen  China's position in the negotiations.$ The negotiations started on July 10, 1951. By May 21, 1952, agreement  had been reached on 4 of the 5 items. They were the  signing procedure, the military demarcation lines, specific arrangements in bringing  about the truce and suggestions to other governments concerned.  However, there was a stalemate on the issue of returning POWs.  In mid-October, the negotiations adjourned  indefinitely.$ As Mao expected, the protractedness of the Korean war led to increased  demand within the U.S. and its allies for immediate end of the war.  During his campaign for presidency in 1952, Eisenhower made it his  most important promise.$ On December 4, while Eisenhower was visiting Korea, the CVA Acting  Commander Deng Hua sent a wired message to Mao, analysing the latest  development of the U.S. forces. He concluded that  after the Republican came to power they would take a  tougher stance and the most extreme measure would be to land behind  the Chinese and North Korean armies to expand the war.#+[19]_ According to this information, Mao and Zhou  judged that "the adjournment of the negotiations indicates that the  loss of U.S. forces has not reached such an extent that it had to stop,  the Korean war will likely become even more fierce for a certain  period in the future (say a year)."#+[20]_ On December 30, Mao cabled the  military units concerned and made detailed arrangements against a  possible landing by the U.S. He stated that the landing would be the last  resort of the U.S. forces. "As long as we can forestall their landing  and defeat their adventure, their final defeat will be assured."#+[21]_  Thereafter, the CVA engaged in a large-scale mobilization and  preparedness drive. The core of the plan was to construct more  defensive facilities to improve the defense system.$ The CCP leaders, nevertheless, still took the worst situation  into their consideration. The large-scale  construction of defense facilities from the fall of 1952 to the spring  of 1953 was a  measure the Chinese and North Korean armies could take under the  circumstances against a U.S. nuclear attack. During the Shangganling  battle, U.S. artillery forces shelled the CVA's tunnels. It took almost  a meter off the top of the mountains, yet the tunnels remained largely  intact. This experience increased the CVA's confidence in relying on  tunnels against U.S. shelling. The CVA headquarters ordered building  permanent tunnels so that they would be safe "against air raids,  artillery, gas, rain, humidity, fire and cold."#+[22]_ In addition,  combined with other facilities, they could be used both for defensive  and offensive purposes. CVA soldiers could use them to launch small- scale harassments and attacks and accumulate small victories into big  ones. Also, the tunnels enabled the CVA to put only a small number of  soldiers on the front line while keeping most of the troops along the  second defense line, thus constituting an extensive defense system.  In this way the CVA could not only avoid losses from U.S. first strikes but  also retain their ability to strike back. The purpose was to bog the  enemy down and impose losses on them so that they would have to accept  terms of negotiations. When the CVA Šwas actively involved in preparing against the enemy's possible  landing behind the front line, the CCP leaders were also considering  with increased urgency how to have a breakthrough on the issue of the  return of POWs. In mid-February, Zhou consulted  with the Chinese and North Korean negotiators regarding  whether China should take the initiative to propose to resume the  talks. They felt that if Kim and Peng wrote to propose the resumption  of the talks, "the other side may think that we are in a hurry and  appear weak. This would create illusions on the other side." #+[23]_ Based  on this judgment, Mao and Zhou instructed the negotiators on February  19 that "the conclusion is that it is better to sit still than move.  We  should prolong the #FKstatus quo#FS_ till the U.S. is willing to make  compromises and take the initiative to do so."#+[24]_ The CCP leaders'  analysis of, and policy on, the resumption of talks showed that  the U.S. nuclear threats did not force the CCP to compromise.$ Just as Mao and Zhou expected, Gen. Clark, Commander of the UN forces,  proposed to Kim and Peng on February 22 to exchange wounded and sick  POWs. Mao and Zhou thought  that Clark's letter could be a signal that the U.S. wanted to resume the  negotiations. The letter did not  mention the resumption of talks directly, but to exchange POWs would  have to involve consultations which would be the same as resuming  negotiations. After consultations with the Soviet Union, the North Korean  and Chinese side formally replied to Clark on March 28 that it agreed  to exchange the wounded and sick POWs and proposed to resume the  Panmunjom negotiations. On April  26, the negotiations which had been adjourned for half a year finally  resumed. On June 8, the two sides reached the  agreement. As many scholars observed from the #^timing,#^  _Chinese and North Koreans decided to compromise and  resume talks before the U.S. made nuclear threats.$ While the negotiations were under way, Mao hoped that the U.S. would  coordinate with its allies and especially Syngman Rhee in making  concessions so that an agreement would be reached soon. For this  purpose and for the purpose of preventing the U.S. from impeding the  negotiations through military actions, Mao on the one hand ordered the  CVA to engage in limited military actions to put pressure on the  enemy and on the other hand, ordered that there should be  strict control over military actions so that they  would serve the needs of political negotiations as perfectly as  possible. The limited military actions were conducted under the  shadow of U.S. nuclear threats. This was one more piece of evidence  that the U.S. nuclear threats did not play a decisive role.$ From May 13 to May 26, when Eisenhower made the final  decision at a NSC meeting to use nuclear threats, the CVA  used four armies to stage the first-round offensive. Since the U.S.  position toughened during the negotiations, the CVA's attacks focused  on U.S. forces. From May 27 to June 16, six Chinese and North Korean  armies staged the second round of offensive. Since the U.S. had already agreed on May 25 to the  Chinese and North Korean suggestions of May 7  (i.e., agreeing to let a neutral country control those POWs that would  not be returned directly) and since Rhee was still sticking to his Šstubborn position, the attacks this time focused on the South Korean  army. This was the time when U.S. Ambassador Bohlen met Soviet Foreign  Minister Molotov (May 28) and asked the latter to convey the message  of nuclear threat to China which, however, was not influenced.$ Since the South Koreans released on the spot 27,000 North Korean POWs  on June 17 and were even saying that they would continue the war  alone, Peng suggested on June 20 to Mao that the signing  be postponed. "The purpose is to deepen the rift within the enemy  and to destroy 15,000 more South Korean forces," he said. Mao  agreed with Peng's suggestion.#+[25]_  CVA used six armies of 300,000 men to start the third round of  attacks on July 13. The battle destroyed four South  Korean armies and pushed south the front line by 15 kilometers. After  this defeat and under the U.S. pressure and coordination,  Rhee finally agreed to compromise. This campaign was  unexpectedly smooth for the CVA. At 10 a.m., July 27, the armistice  agreement was finally signed at Panmunjom. The U.S. nuclear threats  did not stop a series of military actions by the Chinese army.$ An examination of the interaction between U.S. nuclear threats and  Chinese response during the entire Korean war would lead to the  following conclusions. First, U.S. nuclear threats did not have any  major impact on CCP's decision making. Second, with respect to  the possibility of a nuclear war, Mao and other CCP leaders believed  that the U.S. was under a number of constraints and that it was unlikely for  the U.S.  to actually use the bomb. Third, Mao believed that the best way to deal with  nuclear threats was to achieve victory on the battle-ground and not to  be scared. Fourth, even though Mao and other Chinese leaders were  aware of the tremendous power of the atomic bomb, conceptually they  still regarded it as something conventional. Therefore,  the nuclear threats did not change the strategies and  tactics of the Chinese army in the Korean war. But they did force  Chinese leaders to consider how to build up China's nuclear bomb and  how to incorporate their experiences in the war into their future plan  of national security and policies of defensive strategy.$ #T4IV. The Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1954-1955$ - Eisenhower's "New Look" and Mao's "Military$ Modernization" 1954-1957#t Sino-American conflicts the first Taiwan Straits crisis in  1954-1955, provided opportunities for U.S. policy-makers to test their  "New Look" strategy and "Massive retaliation." According to Ambrose's account, "Five times in 1954, virtually the entire NSC, JCS,  and the State Department recommended that he (Eisenhower) intervene in  Asia, even using atomic bombs against China." But the American policy-makers lost  the opportunities as Eisenhower rejected five times.#+[26]$ However, the United States acquired such an opportunity during  the Taiwan Straits crisis resulting from the PLA's shelling on  Quemoy on September 3, 1954, attacking the Yijiangshan Island on  January 18, 1955, and subsequently capturing the Dachen Island. The China-U.S. confrontation  greatly intensified. In order to defend Quemoy and Matsu, American leaders decided at NSC  meetings on March 10 and 11 to resort to nuclear deterrent. ŠDulles expressed explicitly  at the meetings that "If we defend Quemoy and Matsu, we have to use  atomic weapons," because with the New Look, the United States did not  have the strength to defend the islands by conventional arms.#+[27]$ On March 12, Dulles openly threatened to use atomic weapons in a  speech. On March 15, he said the  United States was prepared to use tactical atomic weapons in case of  a war over the Formosa Straits.#+[28]_ The second day,  Eisenhower himself confirmed this point at a press conference.  Ambrose concluded that "Indeed the United States in early 1955 came  closer to using atomic weapons than at any other time in the  Eisenhower Administration."#+[29]_ Precisely at a moment when the world was  much alarmed by the U.S. atomic threat and  Asian countries were gravely concerned with  the situation over the Taiwan Straits, Zhou Enlai sent out signals of  reconciliation at the Bandung Conference on April 23, which were  responded positively by the U.S. and led to a relaxation  of the eight month-long crisis. Dulles said in  private to his assistants: "Diplomacy, in addition to  military threat, had a larger part to play in producing Zhou's  statement."#+[30]$ But, as Bundy doubts, "whether the Chinese were affected more by the  nuclear threat than by the rising cost in their attacks against  the reinforced islands, we cannot know."#+[31]_ Answering this question, it  should be traced back to Mao's intention and his response to American  nuclear threat during the crisis.$ First, Mao initiated this crisis and conducted his actions without  concerning seriously about U.S. nuclear threats.$ Mao had two objectives in this crisis: One was to use limited military  means to demonstrate to the world China's position on the Taiwan  issue in order to prevent a fixed separation between the mainland  and Taiwan. The other was to use its  limited military force to liberate the Dachen islands, the weakest  point in Taiwan's defense line, and other  offshore islands held by Taiwan one by one. Due to the limitation of  PLA navy and air forces, Quemoy and Matsu were not included in the  military plan.#+[32]_ Despite American  nuclear threats, Mao still decided to use limited military action to  bring Taiwan issue into the sharp focus  of the world.$ Mao stipulated the policy of nonprovocative initiatives against  America. In view of the activities of the U.S. 7th Fleet on the sea  near the Dachen Island, Mao postponed the Yijiangshan campaign several  times.#+[33]_ After Molotov passed  on the American warning to China, Mao Zedong stopped  the plan to shell the Dachen port by the navy and instructed the  military commanders to "let the enemy withdraw safely."#+[34]_ After the  retreat of Chiang's troops, the PLA  occupied Nanji Island, the last island held  by Taiwan along the coast of Zhejiang at the end of  February. Thus the battle to liberate the offshore islands at  this stage basically came to an end.$ American nuclear deterrence was obviously  not the reason for the ending of the crisis. Firstly, as one of Mao's Šbasic policies in the crisis was to avoid direct confrontation with  the United States. U.S. military  cover of Taiwan's withdrawal from Dachen Island had  a certain deterrent effect. But there was no direct link  between such military presence and nuclear deterrence. Secondly, as is said above, the operational plans of the Chinese  Communists then did not include the occupation of Quemoy and Matsu at  all. According to the memoir of the then commander Ye  Fei of the Fujian Military Command, he had only two regiments of artillery at the time  with neither navy nor an airfield for the air force. All  this meant the conditions for attacking Quemoy did not exist at all.  The shelling Quemoy on September 3 was entirely his personal  decision.#+[35]_ Obviously a non-existent military action could in no way  prove the effect of the American nuclear deterrence. Thirdly,  the atomic threat  by Dulles and Eisenhower came long after the Chinese communists  stopped military action.$ The U.S. atomic threat had several counterproductive results.$ First, the nuclear threat of the United  States not only failed to cow the Chinese, but quite the contrary,  it was used by the Chinese leaders to further mobilize and  educate the people.$ Secondly, another even more serious consequence of the nuclear threat  of the United States was to force China to develop her nuclear weapons  as soon and as quickly as possible. At  the peak of the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1955, Zhou Enlai inquired in  detail nuclear physicist Qian Sanqiang and geologist Li Siguang on January  14 about the principles of atomic weapons and the  necessary conditions for developing the technology.  The following day, Mao Zedong called an enlarged meeting of the  Central Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Zedong and others  listened to reports and observed demonstrations of newly discovered  uranium mines. The meeting finally decided to develop China's nuclear  industry.#+[36]$ Thirdly, an even more profound influence of the nuclear threat of the  United States on China was the fact that China started to formulate  gradually a whole set of deterrence and security strategy to deal with  the possible nuclear attack of the United States. Under the guidance  of such strategic ideas, national defense construction, weapons  development, service establishment, military training and militia  organizations had all been adapted to fighting under atomic  warfare. In the meantime, contrary to the designed expectations of  the wedge strategy of the United States to split China and the Soviet  Union,  China further strengthened the military cooperation and coordination  with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization under the dark shadow of nuclear threat of the United States.$ #T4V. The Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958 and Its Impact$ on Chinese Military Strategy - Interactions$ among China, USA and USSR#t The crisis over the Taiwan Straits induced by the shelling of Quemoy  became not only the touchstone for the United States, China and the  Soviet Union in verifying the strategic intentions and nuclear Šdeterrent effects of their opponents, but also the turning point in  their relations. This crisis led to the stalemate  in Sino-American relations and Sino-Soviet split, compelling China to  take the road of independent development of nuclear weapons.$ Here is the background. The Soviet Union  agreed on October 15, 1957 to provide  China with an atomic bomb prototype, blueprints, missile samples, and  relevant technical data. At the same time, China expressed interest  in developing nuclear submarines.#+[37]_ Mao Zedong expressed optimistically  at an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Party  on June 21: "I deem it perfectly possible to make some atom bomb,  hydrogen bomb, inter-continental missiles in some 10 years' time." #+[38]$ However, the optimism of Mao Zedong immediately encountered opposition. Soviet Defense Minister Marshall R. Malinovsky addressed a letter on April 28 to his  Chinese counterpart Marshall Peng Dehuai, expressing his ardent desire  for joint Sino-Soviet construction, between 1958 and 1962, of a high-power long-wave radio station for commanding  Soviet submarines in the Pacific region. He said the  technology and a larger part of the expenses were to be covered by  the Soviet Union. On June 12, Peng Dehuai replied in a letter  proposing that China was to cover all the expenses and  own it. But it could be used jointly by both countries. However, the Soviet Union still insisted on the joint ownership of  the center. During negotiations, Zhou Enlai addressed a letter to  Khrushchev on June 28 in which he expressed the hope that the Soviet side  provide technical assistance for building nuclear submarines by China.$ For this, Soviet Ambassador Yuchin met Mao Zedong on July 21 and proposed to use Chinese ports and set up a  joint submarine fleet. Mao Zedong immediately retorted that this was  something like running a military cooperative  - referring to the 4 contracts on  the joint mining of uranium in Xinjiang during the time of Stalin which were abolished by  Khrushchev. Mao Zedong called in Yuchin again and informed him that  China had decided to withdraw the request for  nuclear submarine technology. To set up  a joint fleet meant obtaining control and seeking the right to  lease.$ After receiving the report of Yuchin, Khrushchev went to  Beijing on July 31 to  explain the reasons for the  need of the long-wave radio station and  Chinese ports for fueling Soviet submarines. He  even proposed to exchange Soviet ports on the Arctic for Chinese  ports on the Pacific. Mao rejected categorically Khrushchev's  proposals and  said indignantly that if the Soviet side insisted on running a  joint fleet, "We will not participate. It does not matter if we don't  have nuclear submarines for a thousand years."#+[39]_ Mao also  refused  the proposal about the exchange of bases, saying Š"Every country should keep its armed forces on its own territory and  not on someone else's."#+[40]_ Obviously, the dispute between Mao and  Khrushchev had a far wider range than matters like a radio station or a joint  fleet. It was in essence a question of whether a big power had the  right to interfere in the internal affairs of an ally in the Cold War  structure. Mao stressed the principle of  sovereignty - military cooperation among allies and the nuclear  umbrella of big powers absolutely should not damage the sovereignty  and independence of a country; whereas Khrushchev stressed limited  sovereignty -  the security of each ally should comply with the  overall interest of the socialist camp in nuclear age.  Such different conceptions about sovereignty and state  relations during nuclear times eventually led to the break down of the  relations of alliance between China and the Soviet Union.$ Whether the emergence of nuclear weapons had changed the nature of  war was another major difference between Mao and Khrushchev. First,  whether the military  concepts developed by Mao based on his experiences in the past  wars had become outdated. Soviet military leaders and their advisers had  always wanted to play down the universal significance of the military  ideas of Mao Zedong. The CCP Central  Military Commission called an enlarged meeting in  1958, criticizing the errors of copying the  Soviet experience and reacknowledged  Mao Zedong's military thoughts. The meeting  concluded that "the Chinese communist troops have undergone  the longest revolutionary war in history from the Nanchang uprising in  1927 till the Korean armistice in July 1953. They have fought not only  the largest number of guerrilla wars and mobile wars of the largest  scale in the world, but also the most modern positional warfare on  earth. Such extraordinary rich experience is the most precious basis  of military science."#+[41]$ Secondly, Mao thought the strategy of Khrushchev and his military  advisers to annihilate the enemy at the borderline did  not suit China. As compared with the  United States, the merit of China is political superiority, the  people's war, a huge population, and a strong and large ground force.  Its weakness lies in its very small navy and air force. China is even far  more behind in missiles and nuclear weapons. The army is also poorly  equipped. But U.S. armed forces also have its weakness,  namely its political inferiority with too few people.$ Thirdly, during Khrushchev's visit in August, Mao pointed out that the  power of the United States which had too few troops was limited.  Internal disunity, dissatisfaction of its allies, the rising  nationalist independence movement and the revolutionary movement  (communist movement) all posed as threats to imperialism. The situation  was apparently advantageous to the Eastern Bloc.#+[42]_ With his different  account, Khrushchev argued that western countries were not having a  trial of strength on manpower, but rather on nuclear weapons,  missiles, aircraft and military bases. The Šnumber of soldiers did not count much.$ Mao said "what's the use of being afraid? They want to fight. We  don't have the atomic bomb, but our ally the Soviet Union has it. If they  want to fight, then let us do that. We'll engage in construction after the war. We  have not yet done much anyway." He thought  the U.S.A, the UK and France were all more afraid of atomic war. Mao  further  explained that China was prepared to set up a system in which all the  people are soldiers.  He declared "we don't want an inch of foreign territory even though  we have a huge population. But neither will we give up an inch of  Chinese territory. We have only this much land and we want to defend  it."#+[43]$ Mao Zedong's ideas were soon put to tests. On August 23,  Mao ordered troops at the Fujian front  to shell Quemoy, thus starting the second crisis over  the Taiwan Straits. Two days later, Eisenhower declared at a meeting at the White  House that he was considering to authorize the use of  tactical atomic weapons against the Chicom Airfield. However, he was not  sure whether it would be necessary because he did not want to outrage  world opinion, and it may be better to be reserved on this."#+[44]_ An alternative was  the decision to send the U.S. 7th Fleet to escort Taiwan's supply ships  to Quemoy and Matsu. Both Dulles and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff General Twinning regarded nuclear attack on the military targets  along the Chinese coast as feasible.#+[45]_ However, Eisenhower was fearful  that the Chinese communists might retaliate against Taiwan with  nuclear weapons borrowed from the Soviet Union and refrained  from approving the nuclear attack plan. Then Dulles and the President  jointly issued a "New Ports" statement, openly declaring American escort for Taiwan's ships.#+[46]$ Superficially, the danger of a nuclear war did seem to exist. In his  letter of Sept. 7 to Eisenhower, Khrushchev expressed that "an attack on the Chinese People's  Republic which is a great friend, ally and neighbor of our country, is  an attack on the Soviet Union."#+[47]_ On Sept. 19, he  wrote to Eisenhower straightforwardly: "Those  who harbor plans of an atomic attack in the People's Republic of China  should not forget that the other side too has atomic and hydrogen  weapons and the appropriate means to deliver them and, if the People's  Republic of China falls victim to such an attack, the aggressor will  at once get rebuff by the same means."#+[48]$ In early September, Khrushchev informed the Chinese ambassador Liu Xiao  that the Soviet Union had  decided to send missile carrying jet fighters and bombers capable of  carrying atom bombs to support China and contain the American and  Chiang's navy.#+[49]$ However, the saber rattling posture of both the United States and the  Soviet Union, especially the open nuclear deterrence of Khrushchev, in  fact did not indicate that a nuclear war was imminent. Quite the  contrary, when the voice of the two big powers wielding nuclear  weapons rose ever higher in mid-September, Šthe Chinese mainland and Taiwan in the direct  conflict had passed the dangerous period of a possible outbreak of  an all-out war. $ First, like the shelling on Sept. 3, 1954, Mao's shelling of  Quemoy in 1958 was also a political battle. The military  operation was secondary. His main  objective was to use limited military means to create a tense  situation to verify his judgment about the  American global strategy, especially that towards Asia and China.$ The Middle East crisis provided an opportunity for Mao to verify his  judgment. After the U.S. government declared to send its troops to  Lebanon on July 15, the British followed suit by sending troops to Jordan on  July 17, and on the same day, Mao decided to bombard Quemoy. On  July 18, he pointed out at a meeting of the Central Military Commission  that support to the anti-aggression struggle of the Arab people could  not be confined to a moral one. Practical action was necessary.  Hence his proposal to shell Quemoy and Matsu.#+[50]_  In early August, as  the British and Americans  gradually withdrew their troops from Jordan and  Lebanon, the Middle East situation relaxed. Then a new  tendency emerged in Sino-U.S. relations. The U.S.  government sent a letter on July 28 to Wang Bingnan, PRC's  ambassador to Poland, agreeing to restore the Sino-U.S.  ambassadorial talks which had been suspended for six months. On  August 4, American ambassador to Poland Beam again expressed his  hope to meet with Wang on August 7.#+[51]$ In order to further explore American policy towards China and its  posture over the Taiwan Straits, Mao made the final decision on August 20 to shell  Quemoy.  He decided to shell for 3 days to see Taiwan's reaction  and then decide what to do next.#+[52]$ Despite his decision to shell Quemoy, Mao Zedong was still concerned  with American involvement and whether this would lead to direct Sino- U.S. conflict. He called in his front commander Ye Fei, political  commissar of the Fujian Military District,  to report on the preparations for the operation. He further  inquired if it would be  possible to hit any Americans. When the reply was negative, Vice- Chairman of the Central Military Commission Lin Biao suggested leaking  through Wang Bingnan some message to the Americans that U.S.  casualties would be avoided.#+[53]_ Obviously, Mao never intended to have conflicts  with the United States right from the beginning.$ At 17:30 p.m. on August 23, 26,000 shells flew towards Quemoy.  After 10 days' shelling and sea  attacks, plus limited air attacks, Quemoy was completely blockaded.  Field commander Ye Fei thought Quemoy could be taken easily if  landing was organized then.#+[54]_ However, just at this time, on the  evening of Sept. 3, Mao ordered stopping the shelling for 3 days  in order to observe the reaction of all sides.#+[55]_  Mao's idea thus surfaced.  Strong reaction of the United States and Taiwan might mean that the  United States "will provide protection for Taiwan." Taiwan would try Što defend it on its own. The New Ports statement of Sept. 4 further proved  this. Mao gave up the idea of seizing Quemoy.#+[56]$ The question of China's policy at the resumed ambassadorial talks  was discussed at a politburo meeting in early September. According to the memoirs of the then ambassador Wang  Bingnan who was called back to Beijing, Mao asked him  not to use the stiff language of the Panmunjom negotiations at the  renewed talks. Instead, a tone of persuasion should be  used to seek total U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan. U.S.  withdrawal from Lebanon might give rise to such an illusion of  Mao.#+[57]_ On Sept. 6, Zhou Enlai issued a statement consenting to the restoration of  Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks. Dulles reacted positively on the  same day.$ Second, Mao's bombardment of Quemoy was a test to the Soviet as  there were disputes with them on Socialist Bloc  relations with the West and attitudes toward nuclear warfare. As  described above, Khrushchev was indeed worried that the worsening  situation over the Taiwan Straits might involve the Soviet Union and  wanted to find out what was China's intention in shelling Quemoy.  He also #^hoped#^ _to explore the possibility of  linking China with the Warsaw Pact and realizing Sino-Soviet military  cooperation by making use of the crisis. Mao did not want  the Soviet Union to get involved in Taiwan Straits crisis. After ambassador Liu Xiao conveyed  Khrushchev's proposal on military assistance, Mao Zedong personally  wrote a letter to decline the offer.#+[58]_ After the Soviets got to know  Mao's real intention, the silent Soviet press for  many days started to publish articles in support of China's struggle. Mao Zedong was satisfied with the  moral support by the Soviet Union and its readiness to provide material assistance. All this proved the Sino-Soviet alliance had not  been hurt by their  early dispute.$ The protracted tension on the Taiwan Straits indeed put the  United States in a dilemma. The United States did not want to fight a  war with China over two small islands - Quemoy and Matsu, nor did it  want to  strike the Chinese mainland with nuclear weapons as it was worried about  Soviet retaliation. The policy option  was to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw his troops from Quemoy  and Matsu with the promise to defend Taiwan. But Chiang rejected  the American proposal out of consideration for its legitimacy. At the  end of September and early October, the rift between the  United States and Chiang Kai-shek over withdrawal from Quemoy and  Matsu became open and this attracted the attention of Mao Zedong. He  reasoned that if Chiang Kai-shek was forced to leave Quemoy and Matsu,  Taiwan would be separated from the mainland by a hundred nautical  miles. This would enable the United States to use the Taiwan Straits  to cut off effectively the contacts between Taiwan and the mainland in  a scenario of  "two Chinas." In order to avoid  such a situation, Mao decided on Oct. 5 to Šleave Quemoy and Matsu in the hands of Taiwan.#+[59]_ Obviously, Mao's decision had  nothing to do with nuclear deterrence of the  United States.$ Although the crisis over the Taiwan Straits did not lead to a direct,  large-scale military conflict, it created  a problem between China and the Soviet Union. The  crux was the nuclear technology transfer. During the Taiwan Straits crisis, China became  more active in negotiating with the Soviet Union on  nuclear military technology transfer and finally signed a  Supplementary Agreement on Soviet Assistance to China on the  Construction of its Atomic Energy Industry on September 29.#+[60]_ The  Chinese prompted the Soviet Union to hand over the prototype and blueprint of the atomic bomb.$ However, Khrushchev always had reservations about Chinese  possession of atomic bombs. During his visit to China from July 30 to  August 3, 1958, he refused indirectly Mao Zedong's request for  speedy transfer of atomic weapons. On June 20, 1959, just on the eve  of departure of the Chinese Delegation for the Soviet Union to  negotiate the transfer of atomic bomb prototype and blueprint, the  Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party wrote to the Central  Committee of the Chinese Communist Party formally postponing the  implementation of the agreements for two years, on the pretext of the  negotiations on nuclear test ban and the imminent visit of  Khrushchev to the U.S.A. The Central Committee of the Chinese  Communist Party then decided to ignore Khrushchev and  start to produce the atomic bomb by China itself in eight  years.#+[61]$ The years of 1958-1959 marked a turning point in Mao Zedong's  thoughts. He made two major shifts in nuclear strategy and the  development of nuclear weapons. First, he began to  aspire for a big-power  position with nuclear weapons because he found Soviet  nuclear protection unreliable. He also regarded the development of nuclear weapons  as a symbol of big-power position of strength. In confrontation, "to strive for a position of strength is a  trend of historical necessity."#+[62]_ "They look down upon us  because we have no nuclear bombs, only hand-grenades."#+[63]_ Hence he  said "we should have atomic bombs and develop hydrogen bombs  quickly."#+[64]$ The second turning point in Mao's thoughts was that he  finally integrated the strategic concept of active defense with  development of atomic weapons. First, Mao  decided that the main objective for developing nuclear weapons was  self-defense, in his words, only  to "intimidate the enemies" and "boost our morale."#+[65]$ Second, China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. This  came not only from his long-standing strategic concept of never firing the first  shot, but also from his  judgment of China's own strength. He said that as compared with the  U.S.A. or U.S.S.R., the atomic bombs in China's hands would not amount to  significant numbers. Š"How can we prevail over imperialism with such weapons?  They have so many of them." "We do not intend to win a war with atomic  bomb or hydrogen bomb."#+[66]$ Third, Mao  Zedong still insisted on the active defense policy of letting the  enemy in. On the one hand, this was decided by the  socialist nature of China.  It needed a peaceful environment for its domestic development. On the  other hand, this was also based on his experience and observation. He  had always doubted the possibility of fighting nuclear wars. During the Korean war, the United States  "did have atomic bombs, but did not dare to use it. They now have more  of it, but still did not dare to use it in South Vietnam." He said  many times that "the atomic bomb is not so terrible," "for wars, I  still place my hope on the army."#+[67]_ For this, Mao Zedong stressed time  and again after 1958 the policy of all people being soldiers and the militia  system.$ #T4VI. Conclusions: Paper Tiger or Real  Tiger?#t Through the above case studies we can conclude that:$ The atomic  bomb threat of the United States is not  the direct cause for the prevention of a war or the  ending of a crisis. The reasons are obvious: any  deterrence is based on the assumption that the opposite side  adopts the same criteria to assess the gain or loss of the conflict,  or both sides have the same understanding about the damage.  In the case of Sino-U.S. conflict, we can see that  Chinese leaders, particularly Mao Zedong, and the American leaders used  different criteria to assess atomic bombs or atomic warfare. They lacked  the basis to reaching a common understanding.$ The American nuclear deterrence had a tremendous impact on the  formulation of China's strategic policies and war preparations.  China could only rely on her vast territory and huge population  to achieve a balance of power  with the United States. Mao expanded the construction  of his three strategic lines. From 1963 to 1973, China spent half of her  budget on capital construction with 80 billion yuan (50 billion U.S.  dollars) to the third line building and most of the projects are now  useless.#+[68]_ As is  seen from these facts, Mao was not only not "completely  reckless, arrogant, possibly over confident, and completely  indifferent as to human loss," but rather he was full of a sense of  insecurity and overreacted. On this  point, nuclear deterrence played an indirect role.$ Through these few case studies, we see a  consistent aspect of Mao Zedong's nuclear concept: strategically,  atomic weapons are paper tigers, they  should be scorned. In the confrontation between a  nuclear and non-nuclear power, Mao from a weak technological position  had to emphasize the human factor,  the use of correct strategy and tactics, and tried his best to turn  from the weak to the strong.$ Secondly, Mao always thought it very difficult to use atomic bombs in Ša war. As he saw it, the objective of a war was to  occupy territory and to exploit the people on the territory. Once  atomic weapons are used, land is destroyed and there is genocide.  Then the objective of the war cannot be achieved. Second, he thought the  function of weapons and wars was "to preserve oneself and eliminate  the enemy." If the atomic bomb destroys both the enemy and oneself, it  cannot be used. Third, he realized the  great destructive power of the atom bomb. After the United States  dropped two atomic bombs in Japan, Mao once predicted that due to the  opposition of the people the world over and the moral responsibility  involved in  using atomic bombs, it is quite possible it will not be used  again.#+[69]_ After World War II,  many regional wars broke out, especially the Korean war, in which  the United States threatened repeatedly to use atomic bombs, but never  really used them. Such historical facts reinforced Mao's assumptions  and led him to stress that in the absence of an atomic war, the  strategic and tactical principles he summarized in accordance with his  experiences in the Chinese civil war and the Korean war still have  guiding significance. He still believed that short of a world war,  regional and local conflicts would mainly be wars of  conventional weapons.$ Thirdly, he firmly believed that weapons as human inventions cannot decide the destiny of mankind. He regarded  the progress of weapons as a relative concept. The killing power of  swords and spears in ancient China was not small. The wars then were  no less cruel than those now. Compared to weapons of the Stone Age,  the swords and spears were a leap forward.  The invention of guns and rifles was another leap. The  invention of high tech weapons like the atomic bomb was merely a great  leap forward of conventional weapons. In the short run, advanced  weapons could alter the relative strength of the sides in conflict,  but they could not change the course of historical development in the long  run. Obviously, when he was speaking in such extreme terms as if half of mankind  died in atomic wars, there would still be the other half, he was  not referring to the concrete numbers of atomic war casualties but  making the point that atomic bombs could not destroy mankind.$ Through these case studies, we can find changes  in Mao's concrete strategy about defense against nuclear attack.  Relative to the uncertain and random nature of the American  nuclear strategy during the Truman period, Mao and PLA leaders  did not form their own nuclear defense concepts. They merely  strengthened the alliance with the Soviet Union for  nuclear protection. $ With the advancement of theories of Eisenhower's New Looks and Dulles'  Massive Retaliation, Mao Zedong and PLA leaders started to  form their operational policies of active defense, the so-called  continental strategy. They dug tunnels in Korea, built three layers  of in-depth defensive fortifications, carried out military training  under conditions of nuclear attack, and decided to reduce its army,  develop various technical forces and give priority to developing  nuclear weapons, missiles and nuclear submarines.$ When Kennedy and Johnson put forth the strategy of flexible response  and after the United States and the Soviet Union started negotiations Šon nuclear arms control, Mao restressed the importance of  conventional war and greatly expanded the army. He further extended the  concept of three lines in military defense to the field of economic  construction, forming a pattern of three lines of industrial  construction. In the  meantime, in order to break the nuclear monopoly of big powers, Mao  speeded up the pace in developing China's nuclear weapons and  their carriers for nuclear retaliation.$ Mao judged that atomic bombs would only be used in a world war. In order to prevent the occurrence  of such wars, he raised the so-called noose idea in 1958. He proposed to give full  support to the national liberation movement, divide the western  alliance, take advantage of local tense situations, and check  American military force at various spots over the world, in  short it is what Mao later said preventing wars with  revolution.$ There are limitations of Mao's concepts about nuclear weapons and nuclear  war. First, he did not fully understand the profound change brought  about by atomic weapons on the forms of war. He still used  the traditional concept to observe and handle atomic war. He did  not understand that due to the tremendous destructive power of atomic  weapons, their deterrent power could be used to subdue the enemy.  Such a  war needs not necessarily engagement on land. Neither does it  need to occupy territory as its direct objective. $ At the same time, he did not fully understand that advanced  military equipment and technology may greatly reduce the role of man in  war. Especially the tremendous killing power of atomic weapons could  greatly increase the damage of the opponent in war. Although he recognized that atomic  weapons had greatly enhanced the fighting power,  he did not admit that weapons could eventually settle the wars. As  a person with long years of experience in war, Mao thought  after the Korean war that he had experienced the most modern warfare  ever. He  refused to accept the theory of atomic war deterrence under  hypothetical assumptions. $ On the other hand, he also lacked deep understanding of the after effect of atomic radiation. In April 1964, he showed reports by foreign  media about the rejuvenation of plants on Bikini Island,  hydrogen bomb test site, to  Chinese cadres that atomic weapons were not that terrible. After all,  fish swam as before, grass grew as usual, atomic weapons could not  destroy mankind and nature.#+[70]_ He believed that atomic bombs  were merely a  prelude to ground attack. He did not understand that nuclear  contaminated land could no longer serve as a battlefield for  operations. He overstressed the idea about atomic bombs being paper  tiger and neglected  assimilation of new strategic concepts.  Tactically he overstressed that atomic bombs are real tigers and based Šhis disposition on the conditions of  nuclear war, thereby incurring waste of large  amount of manpower and material. $ Secondly, he did not fully understand the profound change  atomic weapons brought to international relations.  Military confrontation between the two superpowers led  to nuclear competition. The nonnuclear countries in each bloc had to rely  more and more on the nuclear protection of the superpowers. They  were treated as a buffer zone in their own block and a  hostage by the other. Such relationship  had altered the concepts about state sovereignty in the  traditional sense.$ The system of keeping confidential information and the lack of  transparency in decision making in China increases the difficulty of  understanding Mao's policies and measures.  However, the innate prejudice for  communists and the oriental people made it difficult for the Americans to understand Mao's true ideas. During the 1950's-1960's, the  United States adopted a China policy to isolate and contain China, and  to ostracize China in the international community. This made it  impossible for the  leaders such as Mao to mature gradually through  taking part in international activities and  promote common understanding with the outside world  by familiarizing themselves with and assimilating the concepts and ways of  thinking of the mainstream international systems.$ #T4NOTES#t #P[80]#FS ##[D1J100P80] _#+[1]_Ding Jichang et al., #FKWe Grow Up with  Party's Newspaper#FS_ (Bejing: People's Daily Publishing House, 1989),  pp.99-101, p.92.$ _#+[2]_Mao Zedong, #FKSelected Works of Mao Tsetung#FS,  One-volume edition, (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1964),  p.1133.$ _#+[3]_Zhou Enlai, #FKZhou Enlai's Selected Works on  Diplomacy#FS_ (Beijing: The CCP's Historical Documents Publishing  House, 1990), p.319.$ _#+[4]_Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean  War," #FKInternational Security#FS, Winter 1988/89, pp.50-91.$ _#+[5]_Tan Jingqiao et al., #FKThe War to Resist America and  Assist Korea#FS_ (Beijing: The Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1990),  p.17.$ _#+[6]_Interview with Shi Zhe and Lei Yingfu. Interview  with Seiger Goncharov who made notes on his interview with Kapitsa.  Kapitsa used to be a Chinese interpreter and head of the Division of  Far East Affairs of the Ministry of Soviet Foreign Affairs.$ _#+[7]_Mao Zedong, #FKMao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the  Founding of the PRC#FS, Vol. 1, (Beijing: Central Documents Press, 1987),  pp.540-41.$ _#+[8]_#FKIbid#FS.$ _#+[9]_"Mao's Cable to Zhou Enlai on October 13, 1950,"  #FKMao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the People's Republic Šof China#FS, Vol. 1, (Beijing: Central Documents Press, 1987), p.556.$ _#+[10]_Truman Public papers, 1950, pp.725-28, quote from Dingman's  Article.$ _#+[11]_John Newhouse, #FKWar and Peace in the Nuclear Age#FS_ (New  York: Vintage Books, 1988), p.84.$ _#+[12]_"The Central Committee of CCP Notes on A Distributing Report  Made by Peng Zhen (The Mayor of Beijing at that time) on the Works of  Resistance to America and Assistance to Korea." On December 10, 1950, The Central  Archives (CA) in Beijing.$ _#+[13]_CCPCC, "Central Committee's Instruction on the Propaganda  About the Current Situation" on October 1950. CA.$ _#+[14]_Zhou Enlai, #FKZhou's Works on Diplomacy#FS, p.61. Interview  with Pu Shan (one of Zhou Enlai's assistants in the foreign affairs) in  December 19, 1989, Beijing.$ _#+[15]_Sherman Adams, #FKFirsthand Report: the Inside Story of the  Eisenhower Administration#FS_ (London: Hutchinson, 1962), p.102.$ _#+[16]_John Newhouse, #FKWar and Peace in the Nuclear Age#FS, pp.88- 89. McGeoge Bundy, #FKDanger and Survival#FS, pp.240-43. Rosemary  Foot, "Nuclear Coercion."$ _#+[17]_Tan Jinqiao et al., #FKThe War to Resist America and Assist  Korea#FS_ (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1990), p.165.$ _#+[18]_#FKIbid#FS., p.165.$ _#+[19]_Qi Dexue, #FKInside Story of Decision-making During the Korean  War#FS_ (Shenyang: Liaoning University Press, 1991), p.312.$ _#+[20]_#FKIbid#FS., p.313.$ _#+[21]_Mao Zedong, #FKMao's Manuscripts#FS, Vol. 3, pp.656-58.$ _#+[22]_Xu Yan, #FKFirst Confrontation: A Historical Review of the War  to Resist America and Assist Korea#FS_ (Beijing: China's Television  and Broadcasting Press, 1990), p.124.$ _#+[23]_Cai Chengwen £¦ Zhao Yongtian, #FKA Chronicle of the War to  Resist America and Assist Korea#FS_ (Beijing: The Data Materials of  the History of the CCP Press, 1987), p.147.$ _#+[24]_#FKIbid#FS., p.147.$ _#+[25]_Qi Dexue, #FKInside Story#FS, pp.344-46.$ _#+[26]_Stephen Ambrose, #FKEisenhower#FS, p.229.$ _#+[27]_#FKFRUS#FS_ 1955-57, Vol.2, pp.345-60.$ _#+[28]_The World Knowledge Press ed., #FKA Collection of Materials on  Sino-American Relations#FS, Vol.2, (Beijing: The World Knowledge  Press, 1961), pp.2243-46. Robert A. Dinie, #FKEisenhower and the Cold  War#FS_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p.62.$ _#+[29]_Ambrose, #FKEisenhower#FS, p.239, 231.$ _#+[30]_Quoted from Gordon Chang, #FKFriends and Enemies: the United  States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972#FS_ (Stanford: Stanford  Press, 1990), pp.128-30.$ _#+[31]_Bundy, #FKDanger and Survival#FS, p.279.$ _#+[32]_He Di, "The Evolution of the PRC's Policy Toward the Offshore  Islands," #FKThe Great Power in East Asia#FS_ by Warren Cohen and  Akira Iriye, New York, Columbia Press, 1990, pp.223-26.$ _#+[33]_Mao, #FKMao's Manuscripts#FS, Vol.4, p.533.$ _#+[34]_#FKIbid#FS., Vol.5, p.23.$ _#+[35]_Yi Fei, #FKYi Fei's Memoirs#FS_ (Beijing: PLA Press, 1988),  pp.349-50. Interview with Ye Fei, September 12, 1990.$ _#+[36]_Li Jue et al., #FKContemporary China's Nuclear Industry#FS,  pp.13-14.$ _#+[37]_Han Huaizhi, et al., #FKMilitary Affairs of China#FS, p.151; Li ŠJue, et al., #FKChina's Nuclear Industry#FS, p.21.$ _#+[38]_Li Ju, et al., #FKChina's Nuclear Industry#FS, p.563.$ _#+[39]_Mao Zedong, "Mao's Conversation with Khrushchev on July 30,  1958," CA. Liu Keming (he was the head of Bureau of Soviet and East  European Affairs of Department of Party Liaison of CCPCC at that  time), "Lecture on the History of Sino-Soviet Debates" (Beijing:  1983), internal report.$ _#+[40]_Khrushchev, #FKKhrushchev Remembers#FS, p.260.$ _#+[41]_"Resolution of the Enlarged Meeting of CMCCCP on July 22,  1958," CA.$ _#+[42]_Mao Zedong, "Mao Zedong's Conversations with Khrushchev on  August 1, 2, and 3, 1958," CA.$ _#+[43]_#FKIbid#FS.$ _#+[44]_Ambrose, #FKEisenhower#FS, p.483.$ _#+[45]_Bundy, #FKDanger and Survival#FS, p.279; Ambrose,  #FKEisenhower#FS, pp.483-84.$ _#+[46]_#FKIbid#FS.$ _#+[47]_#FKA Collection of Materials of Sino-American Relations#FS,  pp.2697-99.$ _#+[48]_#FKIbid#FS., p.2778.$ _#+[49]_Liu Xiao, #FKEight Years as Ambassador#FS, pp.62-63.$ _#+[50]_Han Huaizhi, et al., #FKMilitary Affairs#FS, pp.386-87.$ _#+[51]_Wang Bingnan, #FKA Recall of Nine Years#FS, pp.68-70. Kenneth  T. Young, #FKNegotiating with the Chinese Communists: the United  States Experience, 1953-1967#FS_ (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,  1968), pp.140-43.$ _#+[52]_Han Huaizhi, et al., #FKMilitary Works of China#FS, Vol.1,  p.394.$ _#+[53]_Ye Fei, #FKMemoirs#FS, pp.654-55.$ _#+[54]_#FKIbid#FS. p.666.$ _#+[55]_Han Huaizhi, et al., #FKMilitary Works of China#FS, p.400.$ _#+[56]_Interview with Lei Yingfu.$ _#+[57]_Interview with Lei Yingfu, Wang Bingnan, and Pu Shouchang (he  was the head of Zhou Enlai's Office and main assistant of Zhou on  foreign affairs).$ _#+[58]_Interview with Pu Shouchang; Liu Xiao, #FKNine Years as  Ambassador#FS, p.65.$ _#+[59]_"Mao's Letter to Peng Dehuai on October 5, 1958" and "Mao's  Cable to Ye Fei and Han Xianchu on October 7, 1958," CA.$ _#+[60]_Li Jue, et al., #FKContemporary China's Nuclear Industry#FS,  p.22.$ _#+[61]_Ibid., p.32 and p.36.$ _#+[62]_Mao Zedong, "Notes on Soivet Textbook on Political Economy  (Socialist Period)," #FKLong Live Mao Zedong Thoughts#FS, Vol.2,  (Beijing, 1967), p.103.$ _#+[63]_Tracy B. Strong and Helene Keyssar, "Anna Louise Strong: Three  Interviews with Chairman Mao Zedong" (London: #FKThe China  Quarterly#FS,  September 1985), p.503.$ _#+[64]_"Mao's Instruction on the Report of the Ministry of Nuclear  Industry in October 1964," #FKLong Live#FS, Vol.4, p.332.$ _#+[65]_"Mao's Instructions After Report by the Leaders of the State  Planning Commission in May 1964," #FKLong Live#FS, Vol.4, p.179.$ _#+[66]_"Mao's Conversation with the General Secretary of New Zealand  Communist Party on May 22, 1963," CA.$ Š_#+[67]_"Mao's Important Speech at the Ming Tombs on June 16, 1964";  "Mao's Instructions during hearing the Report of the Leaders of the  State Planning Commission in May 1964," #FKLong Live#FS, Vol. 4,  pp.184-85, p.189, and p.179.$ _#+[68]_Yan Fangming, "Comments on Three Lines Constructions,"  #FKStudies of Party History#FS, No.4, 1987, (Beijing).$ _#+[69]_Mao Zedong, "Mao's Conversation with Foreign Guests Who Had  Attended the Tenth Conference on Opposing Use of Atomic and Hydrogea  Bombs on August 22, 1964," #FKLong Live#FS, Vol.4, p.269.$ _#+[70]_"Mao's Notes on the News About Situation on Bikini Ten Year  Later After American Hydrogen Bomb Test in April 1964." Mao also  talked to Edgar Snow the same story on January 9, 1965, seeing Snow,  #FKLong Revolution#FS, p.209.$#E